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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
In 1987, the Commission for Racial Justice (CRJ) of the United Church
of Christ issued a report (Commission Report) now credited with bring-
ing the concerns of the burgeoning "environmental justice"' movement
to national attention. 2 The movement dates back to at least 1982, when a
group including the United Church of Christ's Executive Director, Dr.
Benjamin Chavis, Jr.,3 was arrested while protesting North Carolina's
1 Although the terms "environmental justice," "environmental equity," and "envi-
ronmental racism" refer to the same set of concerns, they have each taken on a
slightly different ideological caste. The federal bureaucracy prefers the term "envi-
ronmental equity." Activists tend to favor the more inflammatory "environmental
racism." This Article adopts the most neutral of the terms, "environmental justice," a
phrase that is aspirational but not confrontational.
2 COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic WASTES
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE
SITES (1987) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
3 Others arrested included District of Columbia Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy
and Dr. Joseph Lowery, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 2 (providing a partial listing of those arrested
in the protest).
On April 10, 1993, Dr. Chavis was named head of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), succeeding Rev. Benjamin Hooks. See
Brenda Gilchrist, Chavis Challenges NAACP Members as Convention Closes, DET.
FREE PRESS, July 16, 1993, at 5A.
Dr. Chavis's definition of environmental oppression is extremely broad. Along
with former New Mexico Governor Toney Anaya, he has argued that environmental
racism has a depressingly long history in the United States. Toney Anaya & Benjamin
F. Chavis, Jr., Call a Halt to Environmental Racism: Unscrupulous Toxic-Waste Dump-
ers Target Minority Communities, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 1991, at 3C.
Dr. Chavis and Anaya argue that there was evidence of environmental racism when,
[d]uring the 1930s, hundreds of black workers from the Deep South were brought
in by Union Carbide Corp. to dig the Hawks Nest tunnel [near Gauley Bridge,
West Virginia]. Over a two-year period about 500 workers died and 1,500 were
chronically disabled from silicosis, a lung disease similar to black lung. Men liter-
ally dropped dead on their feet breathing air so thick with microscopic silica that
they could not see more than a yard in front of them. Those who came out for air
were beaten back into the tunnel with ax handles. At subsequent congressional
hearings, the chief contractor said, "I knew I was going to kill these niggers, but I
didn't know it was going to be this soon."
Id. Their editorial equates this historical example with current environmental and
occupational hazards suffered disproportionately by people of color.
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ultimately successful effort to site a dump for highly toxic polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs)4 in Warren County, a largely Black5 area. The Com-
mission Report is best known for its finding, based on an analysis of dem-
ographic data and hazardous waste siting information, that race was the
"most significant among variables tested in association with the location
of commercial hazardous waste facilities" across the United States.6 The
second most important variable was "socio-economic status."7 Although
this variable "appeared to play an important role in the location of com-
mercial hazardous waste facilities,"' the CRJ researchers insisted that it
Perhaps the current environmental justice movement dated back to the lawsuit filed
by Linda McKeever Bullard in Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482
F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). See infra
part II.A.1.
The first federal government response to nascent environmental justice concerns
came in the wake of the dispute in Warren County, North Carolina. See U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNI-
TIES (1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (reporting on the correlation between the
locations of hazardous waste landfills and minority population concentrations, in
response to a request by Congressman Fauntroy on December 16, 1982).
4 PCBs are a class of chemical compounds that are extremely stable and therefore
make excellent coolants and fire retardants. PCBs were widely used in industrial
electrical applications beginning in the 1920s. The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) cut back on their use in 1976, and Monsanto, the sole domestic manu-
facturer, unilaterally ceased production and sales in 1977. PCBs are a suspected
human carcinogen and have been observed to cause both liver and skin damage. For
basic information on PCBs, see RICHARD J. LEWIS, SR., HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
DESK REFERENCE 964-65 (2d ed. 1991) (identifying PCBs as a suspected human car-
cinogen); THE COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL
DATA CLEARINGHOUSE, BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY: A REPORT ON
THE COMPANY'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES app. f. (1993).
5 In the sometimes volatile and always politically weighted area of racial and ethnic
nomenclature, this Article will follow the example of Kimberl6 Crenshaw and capital-
ize "Black," a term to be used interchangeably with "African-American." See
Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment Transformation and Legiti-
mation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) ("I shall
use 'African-American' and 'Black' interchangeably. When using 'Black,' I shall use
an upper-case 'B' to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other
'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a
proper noun."). Correspondingly, this Article will also capitalize "White," on the
grounds that, in this context, the White majority-and particularly White business
and industrial interests-proceeds on a set of cultural assumptions with which the
environmental justice advocate must deal.
6 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at xiii.
7 The Commission Report's primary measures of "socio-economic status," in addi-
tion to the part of "socio" that includes race, were mean income and mean value of
owner-occupied homes. See id. app. b. at 39-50, 64-65.
8 Id. at xiii.
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played a less important role than race.' In addition to its finding about
the siting of commercial hazardous waste facilities, the Commission
Report concluded that minority racial and ethnic populations'0 in the
United States were disproportionately burdened by the presence of
uncontrolled toxic waste sites in their communities."
Soon after the publication of the Commission Report, social scientists
began to treat environmental justice seriously.' 2 Some of the researchers
who worked on the Commission Report have subsequently devoted
themselves almost full-time to the subject, distinguishing themselves as
activists and scholars.'" The University of Michigan School of Natural
9 Id. at xiii, 13 (stating that race was the dominant correlative factor in the location
of commercial hazardous waste facilities). But see infra note 64 and accompanying
text.
10 Meaning Blacks, Hispanics, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and American Indians-the
categories used by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Thaai Walker, Multiracial Resi-
dents Pressing for Box on Next Census, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 1, 1993, at All.
Wherever possible, this Article avoids the use of the term "minority." In this context,
the use of the term is problematic because many of the communities in which contro-
versial facilities exist have primarily non-White populations.
" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 16-17 (concluding that as the minority
population increases in a community, the statistical probability that some form of haz-
ardous activity will occur also increases). The basic conclusions of the Commission
Report were recently confirmed. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal
Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992 (A
Special Investigation), at S, S2 (stating that "[u]nder the giant Superfund cleanup
program, abandoned hazardous waste sites in minority areas take 20 percent longer to
be placed on the national priority action list than those in white areas."); see also
Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Racism Targeted: Congressional Hearing, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 1, 1993, at 3, 3 (reporting the anticipated testimonies of various members of
the poor and non-White communities at a congressional hearing on environmental
justice).
12 The best known of early contributors is the sociologist Robert Bullard. For a
useful summary of his views, see ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE,
CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990). He has also edited a collection of
writings by academics and activists. CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM:
VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinafter CON-
FRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM]; see also RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds.,
1992) (collecting essays on racism and the environment by Robert Bullard and other
scholars); A UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SYMPOSIUM ON MARTIN LUTHER KING,
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: ISSUES AND DILEMMAS (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai
eds., 1991) (same). See generally VOICES FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
(Donald Snow ed., 1992) [hereinafter VOICES] (analyzing the environmental justice
movement and collecting the stories and experiences of many of its early figures). For
extensive nonlegal bibliographies on the environmental justice movement, see Luke
W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Envi-
ronmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 625-27 nn.17-18 (1992).
13 For example, Vernice Miller became a co-founder, with Peggy Shepard and
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Resources now holds an annual conference on race and the environ-
ment,' 4 and activists have twice assembled for national conferences to
share information and plan strategies for correcting perceived environ-
mental inequities.' 5 Others have held smaller, more focused conferences,
a trend that shows no signs of abating.' 6
Chuck Sutton, of West Harlem Environmental Action, a group that has focused pub-
lic attention on the construction of a sewage treatment plant on the Hudson River,
which abuts the historically African-American and now predominantly African-
American and Latino community of West Harlem. See Vernice D. Miller, Planning,
Power and Politics: A Case Study of the Land Use and Siting History of the North
River Water Pollution Control Plant (May 10, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Boston University Law Review) (describing how the location of a sewage
treatment plant, originally planned to be adjacent to a largely White, professional
community, was changed to abut a predominantly African-American community); see
also Hugh Hamilton, Uptown Eco-Blues: Environmental Woes in Harlem, CITY SUN,
June 5-11, 1991, at A18-A19 (reporting on the dispute over the location of the North
River Water Pollution Control Plant). In 1993, Miller was named as the first Director
of Environmental Justice Initiatives at the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), a New York-based environmental advocacy group. Miller's appointment to
the NRDC, one of the nation's "Big 10" environmental organizations, is significant
because of the criticism NRDC and the other large environmental advocacy groups
have received for ignoring urban environmental problems and, more specifically,
those of poor communities of color. See, e.g., Renee Loth, Bringing Earth Day Back
down to Earth: Grass-Roots Activists Tweak 'Elitist' Brethren, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
21, 1991, at A33 (reporting that in 1991 "Richard Moore, codirector of the Southwest
Organizing Project in New Mexico, accused each of the so-called Big 10 environmen-
tal organizations-including the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation and the
Audobon Society-of 'environmental racism,' noting that just five of 137 members on
their combined boards were members of minority groups"); see also A Place at the
Table: A Sierra Roundtable on Race, Justice, and the Environment, SIERRA, May/June
1993, at 50 (bringing prominent proponents of environmental justice together for a
roundtable discussion on race and the environment).
14 Professors Bunyan Bryant and Paul Mohai of the School of Natural Resources
coordinate the conference.
1 See, e.g., Minority Groups Protest Pollution, Plan to Protect, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25,
1991, § 1, at 10 (describing The First National People of Color Leadership Summit on
the Environment, held in Washington, D.C.). Since then, regional summits have been
held throughout the country. See, e.g., Tribes Say Feds Lax on Pollution, CoM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), May 27, 1993, at 1B (describing a three-day summit by
representatives of 30 tribes from Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin); The 1994 New
York/Bronx Environmental Justice Summit Coordinating Committee, Bronx Environ-
mental Coalition Proposal for Environmental Assessment and Remediation Initiatives
(on file with the Boston University Law Review) (proposing plans for an October 1994
summit with federal, state, and city officials to discuss disproportionate environmental
burdens borne by the Bronx).
16 One such conference was the Coalition on Native Rights Conference in Chero-
kee, North Carolina from May 13-15, 1993. The Coalition's work focuses on the inter-
relation of civil rights and environmental issues. The concern among Native groups
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More recently, on February 11, 1994, President Bill Clinton issued an
Executive Order recognizing the disproportionate environmental bur-
dens borne by poor communities, and especially communities of color.' 7
The Executive Order mandated that "each Federal agency shall make
achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations."' 8 Whether this Exec-
utive Order will have more than an "evanescent life," of course, remains
to be seen.19
B. Lawyers' Belated Response
Lawyers-and legal academics in particular-have been much slower
to respond to concerns about environmental injustice. For whatever rea-
son, whether because the subject falls outside the purview of traditional
course offerings ° or, less charitably, because law schools tend to be
slower than social science faculties to integrate pressing social issues and
adjust their curricula accordingly,2 ' legal academics have produced
remarkably little writing on environmental justice issues. What does exist
is of relatively recent vintage.22 The reluctance of legal academics to take
about such issues is timely. Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Select Com-
mittee on Indian Affairs, "reports that there are currently 650 solid waste disposal
sites located on Indian lands; 108 were in existence prior to RCRA [Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act of 1976] standards for such landfills, and only two of those
are currently in compliance with RCRA requirements." Anthony R. Chase, Assess-
ing and Addressing Problems Posed by Environmental Racism, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.
335, 343 (1993).
17 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
18 Id. § 1-101; see Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 279 (Feb. 11, 1994).
19 Environmental Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at A34.
20 See Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6 (1993)
(stating that the subject of environmental torts "has not penetrated most law school
courses on tort law").
21 In his recent article, Professor Richard Lazarus thanks one of his law students
for teaching him "that this was a topic warranting greater academic inquiry." Richard
J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environ-
mental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 787 n.* (1992).
22 In fact, some of best legal writing in the area has been produced by practitioners,
such as Luke Cole, supra note 12, and law students, such as Rachel D. Godsil, Note,
Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394 (1991). For a legal bibliog-
raphy, see Lazarus, supra note 21, at 791 n.14. In addition, the University of Colorado
Law Review devoted the bulk of a recent issue to the subject. National Resources
Issue, Race, Class, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992).
Other journals are doing the same. See, e.g., 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425 (forthcom-
ing Spring 1994).
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on the subject of environmental justice may be changing, but the legal
literature remains highly theoretical, largely concerned with exploring
equal protection bases for environmental justice lawsuits.23
Activist environmental lawyers, however, have been unsuccessful in
applying equal protection analysis.24 Although it is essential for scholars
to continue to explore new means of fashioning an equal protection chal-
lenge, it is also clear that something more is needed. In particular, law-
yers representing communities experiencing current pollution, struggling
with the continuing effects of past pollution, and opposing possible siting
of additional toxic activities have an immediate, pressing need for strate-
gies and tactics to combat both existing and threatened instances of envi-
ronmental injustice.
C. Rethinking CERCLA Medical Monitoring Lawsuits
This Article argues that by concentrating largely on expanding the
scope of constitutional jurisprudence, lawyers and legal academics have
failed to examine possibilities for strategic lawsuits using the elaborate
array of existing federal environmental statutes. Specifically, both law-
yers and legal academics have needlessly neglected or shied away from
the medical monitoring lawsuit available under section 107(a)(4)(B) of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 25 to the disadvantage of potential environ-
mental justice plaintiffs.
In advancing this suggestion, I emphasize that it is offered as an exam-
ple of one possible option available to environmental justice lawyers.
Conceivably, there are other legal alternatives worth pursuing.26
Ultimately, activist and lawyer Luke Cole may be right when he sug-
gests that the grassroots environmental justice movement will be more
23 See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to
Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 779-
801 (1993) (suggesting that the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Protection Clause, the
Thirteenth Amendment, and the substantive due process limits on the police power
can support a right to protective zoning for low-income communities of color); Laza-
rus, supra note 21, at 834-42 (examining the Equal Protection Clause, Titles VI and
VIII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 as bases for lawsuits); Peter L.
Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41
KAN. L. REV. 272 (1992) (recognizing the limitations of federal equal protection anal-
ysis and arguing for state equal protection claims employing a disparate impact analy-
sis); Edward P. Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism,
Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection
Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937 (1993) (suggesting ways of adapting equal protection
to guard against true institutional racism while leaving legislative bodies as free as
possible).
24 See infra part II.A.
25 CERCLA, § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
26 See infra part III.
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successful if lawyers aim to "empower" their clients to become their own
advocates rather than concentrating too much on more traditional lawy-
ering functions such as filing lawsuits and participating in the rule-making
processes. However, it should be recognized that, particularly in the
short run, very few lawyers are likely to fit Cole's model of the activist-
citizen-advocate. In other words, it is probably better to leave environ-
mental lawyers to focus on what they have been trained to do: shape the
laws to their clients' advantage and advocate appropriate changes when
the laws offer insufficient protection.28 An activist environmental justice
lawyer need not be as suspicious as Cole of the possibilities of using
established environmental laws.29
D. The Usefulness of the CERCLA Medical Monitoring Lawsuit
"CERCLA's legislative history makes clear that the statute's basic goal
is to protect public health and the environment. 30 In addition, "[a] sec-
27 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 12, at 659. Cole is speaking specifically about the
legal services lawyer's role in fighting environmental justice battles: "The model of
empowerment described in this essay is a sympathetic challenge to the traditional
legal services model, a gentle push to get legal services lawyers to rediscover empow-
erment as a goal of lawyering and as a means of social change." Id. His views are
informed by his central role in a legal and political struggle to stop the siting of a
hazardous waste incinerator in Kettleman City, California by Chemical Waste Man-
agement, the nation's largest handler of toxic and hazardous wastes. Kettleman City,
in the middle of the San Joaquin Valley, is already the site of the nation's fifth-largest
hazardous waste landfill. The community is 95% Spanish-speaking. Cole acted as
lead counsel for the county in halting the siting on a number of grounds, including the
claim that crucial documents should have been translated into Spanish. Id. at 674-79
(recounting the Kettleman City struggle).
28 But see Marcia Coyle, Lawyers Try to Devise New Strategy, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21,
1992, at S8, S8 (quoting Cole as referring to and rejecting this type of lawyering as
"the macho law brain approach").
29 According to Cole:
Environmental laws are not designed by or for poor people. The theory and
ideology behind environmental laws ignores the systemic genesis of pollution.
Environmental statutes actually legitimate the pollution of low-income neighbor-
hoods. Further, those with political and economic power have used environmen-
tal laws in ways which have resulted in poor people bearing a disproportionate
share of environmental hazards.
Cole, supra note 12, at 642; see also id. at 649-50 (describing why the traditional legal
system has failed poor communities); cf. MELISSA F. GREENE, PRAYING FOR SHEET-
ROCK 187-208 (1991) (describing the successful mobilization of Black voters in a
Georgia county during the 1970s when a lawsuit was coupled with grassroots, commu-
nity activism).
" SUSAN M. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT,
CLEANUP, LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 12.03[4][c] (1993). Although CERCLA's
broad purpose is fairly clear and agreed upon, its details, particularly concerning
implementation, are heavily debated. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
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ond guiding principle underlying CERCLA is that the cost of hazardous
waste cleanup should rest on those ultimately responsible for the waste.
This is the 'polluter pays' principle."'" CERCLA's extensive scheme pro-
vides for the payment of hazardous waste cleanup in two ways. First, it
created a fund-the so-called government "Superfund"-to pay for haz-
ardous waste cleanups.32 Second, CERCLA imposes strict liability for a
wide array of parties having any connection to the creation of hazardous
waste sites, including, for instance, anyone who currently owns or oper-
ates, or previously owned or operated, a site.33 In 1986, Congress signifi-
cantly amended CERCLA with the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). 4 SARA addressed a wide range
of issues, including revised cleanup standards and schedules, as well as
litigation and liability questions.3 5 SARA significantly increased both the
Superfund and the scope and complexity of CERCLA.3" CERCLA is
now scheduled for amendment yet again.3 7
The aims of the CERCLA medical monitoring lawsuit are simple and
straightforward. 8 In connection with a CERCLA cleanup, plaintiffs
request continuing medical monitoring such as blood, urine, and tissue
31 COOKE, supra note 30, § 12.03[4][d].
32 Superfund is financed largely by a tax imposed on oil, petrochemical feedstocks,
chemicals, and hazardous waste. Id.
33 The liability provisions appear at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606-9607 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
34 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 26, 29, 33,
and 42 U.S.C.).
35 COOKE, supra note 30, § 12.04.
36 Id. § 12.05.
31 See, e.g., Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Superfund, Recycling, and Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on Environ-
ment and Public Works, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) (including a statement by
NAACP Executive Director Dr. Chavis); Peter B. Priestley, The Future of Superfund,
79 A.B.A. J. 62 (1993) (examining the history, criticisms, and future of CERCLA);
John M. Cushman, Jr., Administration Plans Revision to Ease Toxic Cleanup Criteria,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at Al (discussing a bill proposed to modify CERCLA); Not
So Super Superfund, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, at A16 (discussing current ideas within
the EPA for improving CERCLA); see also note 45.
38 The issue of whether medical monitoring expenses are covered by Superfund
was first addressed in a nonlitigation context in Dan A. Tanenbaum, Comment, When
Does Going to the Doctor Serve the Public Health? Medical Monitoring Response
Costs Under CERCLA, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 925, 944-46 (1992). Recent contributions
include Kathryn E. Hand, Comment, Someone to Watch over Me: Medical Monitoring
Costs Under CERCLA, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 363 (1994) (proposing public
health-oriented medical monitoring of all CERCLA response actions). But see Kris-
tin E. Sweeney, Comment, Daigle v. Shell Oil Company and the Bumpy Road to the
Recoverability of Medical Monitoring Expenses Under CERCLA, 47 VAND. L. REV.
235 (1994) (concluding that CERCLA precludes recovery of medical monitoring
expenses).
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sample tests to determine the effectiveness and extent of the cleanup.
This Article assumes that the appropriate form of medical monitoring
would vary depending upon the nature of the cleanup. Although it is
beyond the purview of this Article to outline a medical monitoring
scheme that is properly the concern of medical professionals, epidemiolo-
gists, scientists, and even engineers, it is worth noting that models do exist
for long-term medical monitoring to determine the impact of hazardous
substances on human health and welfare.3 9
Plaintiffs typically characterize their requests for medical monitoring
under CERCLA as a "necessary cost of response" under section
107(a)(4)(B), which provides, in relevant part, that
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release,
or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for ....
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan .. .
Plaintiffs draft their claims to come within CERCLA's general statutory
purpose to protect the public health, welfare, or the environment.4'
At first glance, the suggestion that lawyers should mount more CER-
CLA medical monitoring claims is likely to strike many, and particularly
experienced practitioners in the area, as a sure losing proposition. The
federal district courts are split on whether medical monitoring costs are
compensable as "necessary costs of response" under section
107(a)(4)(B).42 The single federal appellate court decision on the issue
resoundingly denied awarding any medically-related response costs under
CERCLA.43 Moreover, during a period of economic uncertainty, critics
are likely to greet the suggestion that courts employ yet another tool for
assessing liability with extreme skittishness, especially because CERCLA
is notorious for its poor draftsmanship and the runaway costs associated
39 For example, in Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 445 (W.D.
Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988), non-CERCLA medical monitoring
consisted of a health questionnaire, blood specimens, urine specimens, and a brief
physical exam. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
40 CERCLA, § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
41 See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
that CERCLA response costs do not include medical monitoring). Plaintiffs usually
focus on the public health and welfare language in the definition of remedial or long-
term CERCLA actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). However, language about the statute's
role in protecting the "public health or welfare or the environment" appears through-
out the statute. See, e.g., id. §§ 9602(a), 9660(b).
42 See infra part V.
43 Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535-37.
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with its imperfect enforcement. 4 In addition, courts may be reluctant to
expand liability because this controversial statute probably will undergo
yet another major revision in the next few years.45
Nevertheless, some courts have articulated tests for determining when
medical monitoring is appropriate. Although these tests appear in non-
CERCLA cases, courts could easily adapt them to CERCLA medical
monitoring claims. For example, in Bocook v. Ashland Oil, Inc. ,46 a fed-
eral district court concluded that under Kentucky law, to recover the
44 Courts seeking to restrict CERCLA's scope recite, ad nauseum, dicta in Arte-
sian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1285 (D. Del. 1987) (assert-
ing that CERCLA response costs do not include compensation for economic damages
or personal injuries), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting CERCLA's often
ambiguous and badly drafted provisions). See, e.g., Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 28
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1668 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (quoting Artesian, 659 F. Supp. at
1285). CERCLA is routinely criticized by both industry groups and environmentalists
for being an ineffective response to hazardous waste cleanup issues. See, e.g., Envi-
ronmental Research Foundation, After 12 Years Studying Toxic Dumps, Government
Knowledge Remains Sketchy, RACHEL'S HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Feb. 12, 1992, at
1 ("Spending at least $7.5 billion over the last 12 years, the [EPA] has managed to
clean up only 64 sites."); Program Wastes Money Addressing Risks EPA Has Exagger-
ated, Industry Group Says, [Current Developments] 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 420 (July 9,
1993) ("The federal superfund program is wasting huge amounts of money to address
risks that the [EPA] has greatly exaggerated .... ."); Bruce Van Voorst, Toxic Dumps:
The Lawyers' Money Pit, TIME, Sept. 23, 1993, at 63 (criticizing the failure to clean up
sites and the accompanying boom in litigation).
45 See, e.g., Priestley, supra note 37, at 62, 64-65 (describing suggestions for
improving Superfund); see also Browner to Try Administrative Fixes to Program
Before Seeking Legislative Action, [Current Developments] 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 39
(May 14, 1993) (summarizing administrative fixes the EPA will attempt before mak-
ing legislative recommendations for Superfund); Courts to Blame for Much of Prob-
lem with Superfund, Industry Attorney Says, [Current Developments] 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 632 (Aug. 13, 1993) (describing items that will be examined during the
reauthorization process); Site Listing, Cleanup Should Be More Fair, Based on Actual
Risks, Witnesses Tell Panel, [Current Developments] 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 32, 32-33
(May 14, 1993) (describing the Senate hearing testimony of witnesses, including Dr.
Chavis, who claimed that the EPA has cleaned up less risky sites and left riskier ones
untouched).
In fact, the arguments advanced in this Article would help clarify the appropriate
form of future amendments to CERCLA concerned with affecting more efficient
cleanups serving CERCLA's original purpose to protect the public health and wel-
fare. CERCLA has been extensively criticized for not meeting these original goals.
See, e.g., Van Voorst, supra note 44, at 63. Groups with an interest in environmental
justice issues clearly appreciate the importance of incorporating their concerns into a
revised CERCLA. See NAACP Joins Groups Seeking Superfund Reform, Including
Elimination of Retroactive Liability, [Current Developments] 24 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1209 (Oct. 29, 1993) (describing a Superfund reform plan jointly developed by the
NAACP, business groups, and insurance companies).
46 819 F. Supp. 530, 534 (S.D. W. Va. 1993).
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costs of future diagnostic testing, each plaintiff must prove not only expo-
sure to toxic substances but also: (1) significant exposure to a proven haz-
ardous substance; (2) a significant increased risk of contracting a serious
latent disease; (3) an increased risk that makes periodic diagnostic exami-
nations reasonably necessary; and (4) existing monitoring and testing pro-
cedures that make early disease detection possible and beneficial. a7
This Article therefore suggests reexamining the strategic use of CER-
CLA medical monitoring lawsuits in the context of the environmental
justice movement. Part II discusses the failure of equal protection analy-
sis and argues that it is not likely to result in successful environmental
justice lawsuits in the near future, despite some promising notions
explored in the legal literature. Part III analyzes the short-term limita-
tions of other proposed legal options available to the environmental jus-
tice advocate. Part IV presents some of the advantages of CERCLA
medical monitoring claims. Part V proposes incorporating medical moni-
toring claims into the environmental justice advocate's strategic arsenal
and criticizes the reasoning of the case law that has disallowed such
claims. Part V also contends that, contrary to the views of some courts,
the most influential of the decisions disallowing recovery of CERCLA
medical monitoring costs, Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp.,4 provides an
analysis that is neither persuasive nor comprehensive.
This Article concludes that the increased use of medical monitoring
would have at least two salutary results. First, incorporating medical
monitoring into CERCLA cleanup efforts would help further the draft-
ers' goal of applying CERCLA more efficiently.4" Second, the recogni-
tion of the validity of medical monitoring and surveillance expenses as
47 Id. (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991)).
48 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
49 Increased efficiency would result from providing data that identifies the actual
threat to public health and the environment from uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.
This is grounded in CERCLA's legislative history. In the wake of the Love Canal
disaster, Congress could no longer postpone its work on bills addressing the devasta-
tion hazardous dump sites were wreaking on the public health. In his 1979 address to
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works at the first hearing on
CERCLA, Senator Robert Stafford cautioned that
these [committee] hearings deal with more than just the problem of abandoned
hazardous waste sites. The orphaned site problem is important, and it is justly
receiving a great deal of attention. Not only are water supplies being contami-
nated, but untold number of innocent persons are exposed to extremely toxic and
hazardous chemicals. Some places, such as Love Canal, have become environ-
mental ghettos .... What we must explore is the entirety of how and why toxics
are entering the environment, whether they are injuring people, and if so, how.
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980) (quoting COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT
AND PUBLIC WORKS, AT JoINT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLLUTION AND RESOURCE PROTECTION, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
(statement of Senator Robert T. Stafford)). Although CERCLA's legislative history
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one of CERCLA's "necessary costs of response" would serve communi-
ties of color and low-income across the nation, by providing them with
hard, empirical evidence of the very real toxic threats they face. In this
way, medical monitoring suits could amplify and support the evidence of
environmental injustice documented in the Commission Report, the con-
clusions of which some commentators have recently attacked.50
II. THE FAILURE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES
A. Case Law
Three cases form the basis of the failed efforts to mount an equal pro-
tection challenge to the siting of waste disposal facilities.5 Although
each of these cases involves the siting of waste disposal facilities, this
Article assumes that the equal protection challenges they advance would
also fail in cases involving the sitings of or threats posed by other indus-
trial activities or pollution.52
Although other commentators have analyzed these decisions as envi-
ronmental equal protection cases, 53 this Article considers them in the
is notoriously unreliable, see infra notes 187-89, the above general proposition is
uncontradicted in the legislative history.
50 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 21, at 802 n.56 (criticizing the statistical methods
employed in the Commission Report). The details of his argument aside, it is note-
worthy that in his Article's title, Lazarus put the phrase "environmental justice" in
quotation marks, id. at 787, reflecting the fact that for lawyers the notion is still possi-
bly a questionable one or, at a minimum, a young and unrecognized subject of
inquiry. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Equity
and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1010-15
(1993) (analyzing the claims for disproportionate siting of landfills in poor and minor-
ity neighborhoods and outlining possible alternatives to ensure fair siting).
51 R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991) (concluding that
there was no discriminatory intent in the siting of a landfill in a predominantly Black
area), aff'd mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb TWiggs Neighborhood
Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.),
aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Manage-
ment Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that plaintiffs must show
that a permit was granted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race), aff'd
mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
Lazarus begins his discussion of the equal protection case law in the environmental
justice context with a case concerning plans to construct two highways through a pub-
lic park in a "minority" neighborhood. Lazarus, supra note 21, at 829-31 (discussing
Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Env't v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa.
1971)). Because the activity challenged in that case was not industrial and did not
involve hazardous waste, this Article does not consider it.
52 See Cole, supra note 12, at 625 n.17 (listing the environmental hazards facing the
poor and providing a bibliography of the literature about efforts to correct them
nationwide).
11 See, e.g., Reich, supra note 23, at 290-304; Godsil, supra note 22, at 411-21, 424.
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context of an argument exploring federal environmental statutory alter-
natives. Indeed, other commentators may have been too quick to group
the cases together, rather than scrutinize their differences-differences of
disheartening consequence to the environmental justice advocate.54 An
analysis of the differences illustrates the imaginative, but unsuccessful,
efforts of lawyers to challenge environmental siting decisions with tradi-
tional equal protection challenges. It also reveals the courts' reluctance
to endorse the views of plaintiffs claiming environmental injustice. More-
over, such an analysis exposes the difficulties lawyers are likely to
encounter in raising equal protection claims without data evidencing
actual physical harm to communities burdened by the siting of undesir-
able facilities. In sum, this analysis suggests that Professor Derrick Bell's
nearly twenty-year-old observation regarding equal protection and other
constitutional law enforcement strategies still remains depressingly true:
"[M]inority rights are worth only as much as those in the majority respon-
sible for their enforcement are willing to invest."55 Therefore, it is essen-
tial for the environmental justice advocate to build a compelling
statistical and evidentiary case that the majority cannot easily ignore.
1. Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.56
In Bean, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the decision by the Texas
Department of Health (TDH) to grant a solid waste facility permit to the
defendant.57 The preliminary injunction hearing took a remarkable
eleven days, apparently owing to the large quantity of statistical data.5"
54 Reich, supra note 23, at 293 (finding that the three cases are similar "in both
reasoning and result").
55 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current
Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 21 (1976).
56 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
57 Id. at 674-75 & n.3 (alleging that the decision to site the waste facility in Harris
County was "at least in part, motivated by racial discrimination").
58 Id. at 674 n.1 (noting that "[a]pproximately twenty-five witnesses testified and
eighty exhibits were received into evidence"). An issue not addressed by this Article
but requiring further analysis in the CERCLA medical monitoring context and similar
cases is the question of the ability of courts to entertain complicated and often contra-
dictory scientific data. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786, 2793, 2799 (1993) (holding that "general acceptance" of a theory by the scien-
tific community is not a prerequisite to admissibility into evidence, and that Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, which assigns to the trial judge the task of ensuring that all
presentations rest on reliable scientific foundations, supersedes the Frye-test
standard).
Furthermore, a major concern for the advocate in this area is that the data on
chemical toxicity is comparatively under-developed. See, e.g., BARRY COMMONER,
MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 50 (1992) (noting that "only 289 of the 700 chemi-
cals currently used in U.S. pesticides have been sufficiently tested to evaluate their
side effects; many pesticides that have passed the tests are later found to be harm-
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
observed that the plaintiffs appeared to have been compelled to bring the
matter to court: TDH witnesses "indicated that the agency[,] in keeping
with its statutory authority, would not examine allegations of racial dis-
crimination in site selection."59
The court then considered the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction.6" The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had established a
substantial threat of irreparable harm to their constitutional rights and
that specifically, "[t]he opening of the facility will affect the entire nature
of the community-its land values, its tax base, its aesthetics, the health
and safety of its inhabitants, and the operation of Smiley High School,
located only 1700 feet from the site."'" It declined to issue the prelimi-
nary injunction, however, because the plaintiffs had not met their burden
of proving discriminatory purpose and therefore had not shown a sub-
stantial likelihood of success on the merits.62
In reaching this conclusion, the court strained to display its ideological
ful[, yet] each year 750 million pounds of pesticides are sprayed across the U.S. land-
scape"). As one commentator has observed: "The legal system is playing catch-up
with the medical and scientific communities by recognizing the individual and public
benefits of early diagnosis of toxic exposure-related diseases." Amy B. Blumenberg,
Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical Surveil-
lance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 682 (1992).
The issue of what scientific evidence to admit and the ability of lawyers to evaluate
it will continue to require lawyers' attention in this and related contexts. See, e.g.,
MARGARET A. BERGER, PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY MECHANISMS FOR DEAL-
ING WITH EXPERTS IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION: A CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL (1991)
(analyzing problems with and proposing improvements to the process of expert and
scientific evidence procedures at trial); CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECH-
NOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING CHALLENGES (1993) (examining
the role of science and expert testimony in court proceedings).
59 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 675.
60 Id. at 676.
61 Id. at 677.
62 Id. (noting that "plaintiffs must show not just that the decision to grant the per-
mit is objectionable or even wrong, but that it is attributable to an intent to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race"). The court expressly relied upon the view, articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, that "[d]isproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrim-
ination." 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Proof of racially discriminatory
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Although some contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases, the hold-
ing in Davis reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety of contexts." (footnote
omitted)). The Bean court rejected any inference that the plaintiffs' statistical data
rose to the level that demonstrated discriminatory intent on its face. Bean, 482 F.
Supp. at 677.
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sympathy for the plaintiffs' arguments while finding that they could not,
on the law, make the required legal showing.63 The court's analysis
reveals a central difficulty for environmental justice lawyers who aspire to
succeed on an equal protection theory: Although toxic activities may dis-
proportionately burden racial and ethnic minority communities, the
causes are complicated and thus difficult to separate and prove. 4 For
example, in Bean the plaintiffs argued that census tract information
revealed that the TDH had consistently practiced discrimination by
granting waste permits to operate in minority neighborhoods.6" The
court noted, however, that "[o]f all the solid waste sites opened in the
target area [the geographic area upon which the plaintiffs' lawsuit
focused], 46.2 to 50% were located in census tracts with less than 25%
minority population at the time they opened. 66
63 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679-80 (noting that "[i]t simply does not make sense to put
a solid waste site so close to a high school").
64 See Robert Suro, Pollution-Weary Minorities Try Civil Rights Tack, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 1993, at Al (observing that defendants often argue that no discriminatory
intent exists and that the sitings are based on a variety of economic factors). But see
Cole, supra note 12, at 629 n.28 (citing a report prepared by Cerrell Associates, a
private consulting firm, for the California Waste Management Board, identifying the
most vulnerable communities for siting undesirable waste disposal facilities as being
small, rural, conservative, blue collar, and relatively poorly educated); Matthew Rees,
Black and Green: Race and Environmentalism, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 2, 1992, at 15
(arguing that the Commission Report's data suggests that sitings correlate as much or
more with low income as with race).
65 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677-78 (arguing that the placements resulted from discrim-
inatory practices by the TDH itself or, alternatively, were discriminatory in the con-
text of the "historical placement" of all waste sites around the city of Houston).
"Census tracts" are defined as "small, relatively permanent subdivisions of a
county.... Census tracts do not cross county boundaries. The spatial size of census
tracts varies widely depending on the density of settlement .... However, physical
changes in street patterns caused by highway construction, new development, etc.,
may require occasional revisions.... ." U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, SUMMARY TAPE FILE 3: TECH-
NICAL DOCUMENTATION A-5 to A-6 (Dec. 1991). The vagueness of the Census
Bureau's own definition, to say nothing of the arbitrariness of the classification, is
evidence of the inappropriateness of the measure for environmental justice disputes.
66 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677. Elsewhere, the court noted that, at that time, "Hous-
ton's population [was] 39.3% minority and 60.7% Anglo." The court continued:
The plaintiffs argue, and this Court finds persuasive, a definition of "minority
census tracts" as those with more than 39.3% minority population and Anglo
census tracts as those with more than 60.7% Anglo population. Using those defi-
nitions, Houston consists of 42.5% minority tracts and 57.5% Anglo tracts ....
Again using those definitions, 42.3% of the solid waste sites in the City of Hous-
ton are located in minority tracts and 57.7% are located in Anglo tracts.
Id. at 679. Thus, to a significant extent, the plaintiffs' attempt to use census tracts as a
definitional measure backfired, providing the court with the numerical cutoff points
that would shape its' decision. Id. (stating that the statistics, if they showed anything,
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Bean illustrates several problems that typically face the environmental
justice advocate who brings an equal protection challenge. The difficulty
in presenting a successful case recalls Mark Twain's barb about the eter-
nal malleability of statistical arguments. 67 Not only do plaintiffs' argu-
ments suffer initially from inevitable imprecision in application of the
term "minority," both as used by environmental justice advocates68 and
the community at large,69 but relevant available data on issues such as
low economic status also is generally disallowed in the equal protection
context, a fact that may weaken the evidentiary force of plaintiffs' cases.7"
In addition, and perhaps most frustrating to activists, equal protection
analysis is limited to target area demographics "at the time of their open-
ing."'', Thus, even though a concentration of waste sites in minority com-
munities may exist in the present, equal protection analysis is of little help
if this problem developed after the sites opened.72
Although the Bean court disagreed with the plaintiffs' analysis of the
statistics, 73 the court clearly expressed its view of the fundamental equi-
ties in the case:
If this Court were TDH, it might very well have denied this permit.
It simply does not make sense to put a solid waste site so close to a
high school, particularly one with no air-conditioning. Nor does it
make sense to put the land site so close to a residential neighbor-
"indicateld] that minority census tracks have a tiny bit smaller percentage of solid
waste sites than one would proportionately expect").
67 "There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics." MARK TWAIN,
MARK TWAIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 246 (1928) (attributing the remark to Benjamin
Disraeli).
68 See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 818 n.125 (criticizing the methodology of Lavelle
and Coyle, see supra note 11, as misleading, indicating that many of the communities
counted as "minority" were "predominantly white," but acknowledging that such
communities may "have a different character than communities that are 100%
white"); see also supra note 10.
69 See Bell, supra note 55, at 24:
Consider the very definition of integration. Irrationally, an "integrated"
school, work force or neighborhood is one with no more than a 25 percent black
population. If the percentage is substantially greater, it is no longer a legiti-
mately integrated setting for most white Americans, and is referred to as a
"changing" school, a neighborhood in danger of "tipping," or a "racially
imbalanced" job unit.
70 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (holding that financial need
alone does not identify a suspect class for the purposes of equal protection analysis).
71 See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677.
72 This does not suggest that disparities in clean-up treatment of toxic waste sites
may not be amenable to equal protection claims. See, e.g., Lavelle & Coyle, supra
note 11, at S2 (noting that toxic waste sites in minority communities are cleaned more
slowly, and less stringently, than those in White communities).
73 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677-78 (noting that while the data appeared compelling on
its surface, it "breaks down under closer scrutiny").
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hood. But I am not TDH and for all I know, TDH may regularly
approve of solid waste sites located near schools and residential
areas, as illogical as that may seem.
74
Perhaps more importantly, the court suggested the type of analysis that
future environmental justice advocates should present in order to mount
a successful claim. As a threshold matter, it indicated that a census tract
analysis may be less than ideal.75 The court also encouraged advocates to
ask more probing questions about the nature of the site-selection pro-
cess, suggesting, for example, that a private contractor's choice of a single
site in connection with city and county officials would be more dispositive
of discriminatory intent than if evidence suggests that a site was chosen
from a "relatively limited number of areas" that could serve as sites.76
Finally, the court encouraged advocates to scrutinize the reasons behind
some of the circumstantial evidence, such as questions in this case about
why such waste facilities were sited near schools and in residential neigh-
borhoods after earlier applications for the same general area were
denied.77 The court denied the plaintiffs' motion, however, despite its
74 Id. at 679-80.
75 The court proposed the following line of inquiry:
How large an area does a solid waste site affect? If it affects an area a great
deal smaller than that of a census tract, it becomes particularly important to
know where in each census tract the site is located. If it affects an area larger
than that of a census tract, then a target area analysis becomes much more
persuasive.
Id. at 680; see supra note 65.
76 On this point, the court reflected:
How are solid waste site locations selected? It may be that private contractors
consider a number of alternative locations and then select one in consultation
with city or county officials. If that is so, it has tremendous implications for the
search for discriminatory intent. It may be that a relatively limited number of
areas can adequately serve as a Type I solid waste site. If that is so, the place-
ment of sites in those areas becomes a lot less suspicious, even if large numbers
of minorities live there.
Id. (footnote omitted). One problem with this suggestion, of course, is that develop-
ers will always argue that they have chosen a site because it is one of the few avail-
able, arguing for example, that, in the example of commercial hazardous waste they
look for three factors above all others, namely (1) good transportation access; (2)
large tracts of lands that can serve as "buffer zones;" and (3) geology that will support
toxic activities. See, e.g., USPCI OF MIssIssIPPI, INC., OVERVIEW OF SHUoUALAK
MOUNTAIN FACILITY/ USPCI, INC.I SEC. B, RCRA PERMIT APPLICATION 2 (on file
with the Boston University Law Review) (stating that a proposed hazardous waste
landfill location is desirable because it has is close to U.S. Highway 45, has a buffer
zone, and is surrounded by chalk of low permeability).
77 See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679 (allowing that circumstantial evidence may supple-
ment statistical data). In a footnote, the court further suggested that had plaintiffs
been aware that a waste facility was proposed for their community, they would have
involved themselves earlier in the process and showed their "vociferous opposition."
Id. at 676 n.5; see also Lazarus, supra note 21, at 847-48 (suggesting that the EPA take
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sympathetic treatment, and was affirmed on appeal without an opinion.
78
2. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning & Zoning Comm'n 79
East Bibb Twiggs involved opposition by citizens of Macon, Georgia to
attempts to site a privately-operated solid waste landfill in an approxi-
mately 60% Black census tract.80 The Macon-Bibb County Planning and
Zoning Commission (County Commission) initially denied the applica-
tion, but granted its approval on subsequent reexamination despite the
plaintiffs' protest.8 '
The plaintiffs did not limit their equal protection violation claims to the
analysis of census tract information. They also pointed the fact that the
County Commission district within which the census tract was situated
was overwhelmingly Black-approximately 70%.82 However, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia noted that the
majority population of the area's only other census tract containing a
County Commission-approved landfill was located in a predominantly
White (approximately 76%) census tract.83 The court discounted other
circumstantial evidence suggestive of invidious racial purpose. 4 This evi-
distributional equity into account when it seeks to minimize social risk factors and
noting that the Department of Energy took this approach when analyzing the impact
on minorities of the switch to unleaded gasoline).
78 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986) (mem.). Plaintiffs' counsel in Bean was Linda
McKeever Bullard. Id. She enlisted the help of her husband, sociologist Robert Bul-
lard, to gather data on disproportionate impact. He is now a major figure in the
environmental justice movement. See supra note 12; see also Coyle, supra note 28, at
S8 (quoting Bullard on the lack of adequate EPA measures for addressing the envi-
ronmental problems of minority communities, resulting in overexposure of minorities
to health risks, and effectively encouraging sitings in minority communities).
The Bullards later recalled that the rejection of their preliminary injunction, with its
sympathetic suggestion of information a court might need to find in their favor, was
issued by a Black, female judge. Id. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the case was
transferred before the subsequent hearing to the Chief Judge, who was White.
According to Robert Bullard, "[hle called us 'nigrahs,' ... In the late '70's, we may
still have been 'Negroes.' I know some of us were 'blacks.' But none of us was
'nigrah.'" Id.
79 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
80 Id. at 881 (noting that the tract consisted of 3367 Black residents and 2149 White
residents).
81 Id. at 882-83.
82 Id. at 885 (presenting the argument that the level of analysis should include
geographical areas larger than the census tract in order to show discrimination).
83 Id. at 884.
84 The East Bibb Twiggs court used the Arlington Heights methodology in its anal-
ysis of the approval process. Id. (identifying five contextual factors, such as impact
and historical background, that can be useful in assessing discriminatory purpose
when no direct evidence of intent is available).
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dence included administrative and legislative materials, and anecdotal
information contained in newspaper articles about discriminatory zoning
practices.85
The East Bibb Twiggs court, in rejecting the plaintiffs' equal protection
claims, looked at two additional, nonstatistical factors. First, it focused on
the role of private property:
[T]he court notes that the Commission did not and indeed may not
actively solicit this or any other landfill application. The Commission
reacts to applications from private landowners for permission to use
their property in a particular manner. The Commissioner observed
during the course of these proceedings the necessity for a compre-
hensive scheme for the management of waste and for the location of
landfills. In that such a scheme has yet to be introduced, the Com-
mission is left to consider each request on its individual merits.8 6
This argument-that no pattern of discrimination can be detected
because the applicants are discrete, private parties-presents a formida-
ble obstacle to the environmental justice advocate. 7
Second, the court discounted the bulk of the plaintiffs' evidence
because it focused on governmental decisions made by other agencies,
which "shed little if any light upon the alleged discriminatory intent of
the Commission."88 This aspect of the decision is particularly problem-
atic for environmental justice lawyers because direct evidence of discrimi-
nation is generally unavailable. 9 This evidentiary difficulty exists
because the causes for the disproportionate environmental burden on
minority communities are varied and interrelated.90 Moreover, the his-
85 Id.
86 Id. at 885.
87 On the reach of the "private/public distinction" and the considerable barriers it
can create, see Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners' Associations: A Reply, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1589, 1600-01 (1982); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept., 93
HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1132-33, 1141 (1980).
88 East Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp. at 885.
89 See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 830 (stating that the requirement of specific intent
is "devastating to most civil rights claims"); Reich, supra note 23, at 294 (commenting
that disparate waste siting is "not usually accompanied by evidence of motive").
90 See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 808 (discussing how the lack of political and eco-
nomic power due to vestiges of racist policies make it more likely for minority com-
munities to bear the brunt of societal burdens); Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of
Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 674-82
(1985) (analyzing the disparities between Black and White demographics in areas of
politics, education, housing, occupation, family structure, income, health, and
business).
Interrelated causes may include, for example, declining property values in increas-
ingly "minority" areas following White flight, resulting poverty and need for jobs in
such areas, and limited educational opportunities that fosters a less-politically active
citizenry. See id.; cf Lazarus, supra note 21, at 806-11.
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tory of individual agencies, taken alone, may not be long enough to prove
any discriminatory pattern.91
The East Bibb Twiggs court's rejection of alternative demographic
models and its narrow approach to equal protection analysis have at least
two regrettable results. First, the court did not question the historical
consequences of the choices made by numerous private property owners
as to the use of their land.92 Second, the court's approach resulted in the
rejection of evidence, no matter how persuasive, concerning governmen-
tal actors other than those whose siting decisions might immediately
affect plaintiffs. The court thus created a series of obstacles that pose
almost impossible demands on plaintiffs seeking environmental justice on
equal protection grounds.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the decision virtually without comment.93
3. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay94
The most recent major equal protection case involved another chal-
lenge to a landfill siting. R.I.S.E. was a bi-racial community organization
in King and Queen County, Virginia, consisting mostly of landowners
owning property in the area near the proposed landfill, formed solely to
combat this project.95 Defendants were the county's five-person Board of
Supervisors.96
91 For example, in R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd
mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992), the county did not have a zoning ordinance when
the landfill began operating in 1986. A zoning ordinance did take effect on August 12,
1986. Thus, if a plaintiff attempted to prove discriminatory intent by the County Zon-
ing Administrator, a court could easily find that there was insufficient evidence, and
might not choose to attribute zoning-like decisions before that date to other govern-
mental actors. One can imagine this situation in any number of contexts-all of them
posing almost impossible difficulties for environmental justice advocates. The EPA
itself was only created in 1970 by President Nixon. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed.
Reg. 15,623 (1970), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1343 (1988). Twenty-four
years might be an insufficient period for proving an invidious, historical period of
discrimination. Cf. Bell, supra note 55, at 16 (stating that in the context of voting
discrimination "it becomes almost impossible [to prove] in many urban districts where
there is no recent history of systematic exclusion and election officials are able to
offer nonracial justifications for boundaries and procedures that have a discriminatory
effect").
92 See, e.g., Cynthia Hamilton, Coping with Industrial Exploitation, in CON-
FRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 12, at 67-69 (examining the relation-
ship between private industry and government and its effect on American cities).
93 896 F.2d 1264, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 1990).
94 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
"R.I.S.E." is an acronym for Residents Involved in Saving the Environment.
95 Id. at 1145.
96 Id. at 1146. The court noted that two of the Supervisors were Black and three
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
examined the history of landfill siting in the county dating back to 1969
and concluded that "[t]he placement of landfills in King and Queen
County has had a disproportionate impact on black residents."97 In
reaching this conclusion, the court did not limit its analysis to census
tracts or county commission boundaries, but used a more flexible
approach to determine the affected population.9 s Nonetheless, the court
still found no evidence of discriminatory purpose:
Careful examination of the administrative steps taken by the Board
of Supervisors to negotiate the purchase of the Piedmont Tract and
authorize its use as a landfill site reveals nothing unusual or suspi-
cious. To the contrary, the Board appears to have balanced the eco-
nomic, environmental, and cultural needs of the County in a
responsible and conscientious manner.99
The court added that "the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an
affirmative duty to equalize the impact of official decisions in different
racial groups. Rather, it merely prohibits government officials from
intentionally discriminating on the basis of race. The plaintiffs have not
provided sufficient evidence to meet this legal standard.'
' 00
More starkly than Bean or even East Bibb Twiggs, R.IS.E. set a prece-
dent making it almost impossible for environmental justice lawyers to
bring successful cases on equal protection grounds. The decision demon-
strates, in a bolder fashion than the other two, the reluctance of courts to
acknowledge a series of actions that were in some very real sense deliber-
ate and, evidence suggests, completely routine.' 0 ' Despite the clearly dis-
were White. The Black Supervisors won their posts in a 1988 special election called
following a federally-ordered redistricting. Id. Originally, the landfill was to be a
joint venture between Chesapeake Corporation and the county, but Chesapeake
abandoned these negotiations during the summer of 1988. Id. In December 1989, the
Board voted to execute a purchase option agreement with Chesapeake for the Pied-
mont Tract in order to develop the landfill. Two of the White Supervisors abstained
from voting because they were employees of Chesapeake. Id. at 1147.
97 Id. at 1149.
98 In three of the four cases the court concluded, at the time of site construction,
the percentages of African-Americans living within a "one-mile radius," "the immedi-
ate area," and "a half-mile radius," finding they were 100%, 95%, and 100%, respec-
tively. Id.
99 Id. at 1149-50 (emphasis added). The court in R.I.S.E., like the East Bibb
Twiggs and Bean courts before it, followed Arlington Heights and its requirement of
discriminatory purpose. Curiously, both the R.I.S.E. and East Bigg Twiggs courts
failed to discuss the Bean court's suggestions for a successful equal protection claim.
See supra text notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
100 R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1150.
101 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-14 (statistically connecting the
incidence of the location of hazardous waste activity with the location of minority
populations); GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (reporting that three out of four haz-
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proportionate affect of the facilities upon African-Americans, without a
"smoking gun" that proves a premeditated desire to discriminate because
of race, the case suggests that equal protection challenges to environmen-
tal sitings are unlikely to succeed.
B. Modifying Environmental Equal Protection Challenges: Recent
Legal Literature
R.I.S.E. in particular indicates the pressing need for exploring other,
practical responses to claims of environmental injustice. °2 In response to
the difficulty of challenging environmental injustice under traditional
equal protection doctrine, certain commentators have endorsed a greater
focus on statistical evidence.'013 Professor R. George Wright advocates
ardous waste landfill sites studied were located in communities in which the majority
of the population was Black); Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 11, at S2 (reporting a
significantly slower cleanup in minority areas than White areas); see also Robert W.
Collin & William Harris, Sr., Race and Waste in Two Virginia Communities, in CON-
FRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 12, at 98 (asserting that the R.I.S.E.
court "turned a blind eye to a clear case of institutional racism").
In a separate decision in this case, handed down the same day, the court in part
rejected the defendant's summary judgment motion, holding that "[g]enuine issues of
material fact concerning discriminatory intent preclude summary judgment in this
case." 768 F. Supp. 1141, 1143 (E.D. Va. 1991). The court did not explain why it
chose to issue separate, simultaneous decisions on the summary judgment motion and
the merits.
102 For example, one possible strategy the R.I.S.E. plaintiffs could have pursued
was a historic preservation claim. Mt. Olive Baptist Church, located near the site, was
founded in 1869 by freed slaves. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1147. Some historic preser-
vation claims have been successful in preventing development. See, e.g., Karl S.
Coplan, Protecting Minority Communities with Environmental, Civil Rights Claims,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 1991, at 1 (describing successful efforts to block the development
of a historically Black Florida community into residential, luxury condominiums).
103 See R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of Racial
and Stigmatic Injury, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777, 795 (1991) (stating that "[t]he general
unavailability of any admission of conscious, intended racial discrimination in the sit-
ing process, then, requires us to choose between relying on the best available statisti-
cal evidence, or ignoring the problem of racial discrimination as insufficiently
documented"). Wright chooses the former option although he recognizes that some
people will be suspicious of statistics. Id.
In New York City, environmental justice advocates have begun developing a com-
puter application that will map income and racial data near industrial and toxic activi-
ties by zoning lot number, rather than by less precise county, census tract,
neighborhood, or even city block tracking. Such an application could have revolu-
tionary implications for future equal protection cases. Interview with Reinerio Her-
nandez, Director, Office of Community Environmental Development, New York City
Department of Environmental Protection (Sept. 2, 1993) [hereinafter Hernandez
Interview]. See generally GREENPOINT/WILLIAMSBURG ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS
PROGRAM, NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (available from
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examining the national distribution of hazardous waste sites in order to
determine whether a racial bias is detectable."0 4 If certain communities
are disproportionately affected, Wright favors an enforced spreading of
the burden.0 5 Wright's vision is appealing but unlikely to be imple-
mented successfully. In particular, he offers no explanation why his form
of equal protection analysis would in practice differ from those advanced
by the plaintiffs in Bean, East Bibb Twiggs, and R.I.S.E. After all, in each
of those cases plaintiffs implicitly advocated, like Wright, the equitable
sharing of toxic activities.
Professor Peter Reich similarly concludes that "[i]n order to apply the
equality principle to the distribution of environmental hazards, an effects
rather than an intent standard is necessary.' 0 6 He proposes possible
alternatives to constitutional equal protection analysis, including legisla-
tion modeled on the Civil Rights Acts or an environmental race discrimi-
nation bill containing a disparate impact analysis. 10 7 He concludes,
however, that the political obstacles to passing such legislation are proba-
bly too great to achieve them.'0 8
Ultimately, the real difficulty with equal protection challenges is the
incidence of unconscious or rationalized racial bias.'0 a Although it was
comparatively easy to identify intentional discrimination under Jim Crow,
in a world where private parties make private business decisions, political
and personal motivations are harder if not impossible to identify."0 For
the New York City Dept. of Environmental Protection, Office of Community Envi-
ronment Protection, 59-17 Junction Boulevard, 10th Floor, Corona, N.Y. 11368)
[hereinafter GREENPOINT] (describing a comprehensive program established in
Brooklyn, N.Y.). This kind of mapping may provide a means to overcome situations
like the difficulties encountered by communities of color in reducing air emissions in
their neighborhoods because ambient air standards measure large regions and not
individual communities, a dilemma discussed by Lazarus, supra note 21, at 814-15.
104 Wright, supra note 103, at 792 (asserting that such examination is necessary to
determine "governmental responsibility").
105 Id. at 790. Wright argues:
[S]preading the actual disposal among a larger number and variety of technically
suitable localities would reduce stigmatic injuries and ultimately contribute to a
genuine sense of unity, national solidarity, and the equitable sharing of burdens
contemplated not only by the Equal Protection Clause, but by the Commerce
Clause itself. If the threat of this enforced sharing leads to political pressure for
less production of hazardous waste, or to increased treatment of hazardous
wastes to reduce their toxicity, or to safer landfills, so much the better.
Id. at 790-91 (footnote omitted).
106 Reich, supra note 23, at 294 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 294-95.
108 Id. at 295-96.
109 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 339-44 (1987) (discussing manifesta-
tions of unconscious racism).
110 See Derrick Bell, Learning the Three "l's" of America's Slave Heritage, 68 CH.-
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this reason, it is difficult to agree with Professor Richard Lazarus' conclu-
sion that channeling additional resources to equal protection challenges
could produce "some isolated successes."''
III. THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES
1 12
Recognizing the obstacles courts have created to successful equal pro-
tection claims in the environmental justice context, practitioners and aca-
demics have begun to search for alternatives. Some alternatives either
show analytical promise or at least have been clearly articulated. How-
ever, for reasons that will become apparent, many of them are not likely
to survive judicial scrutiny.
A. Title VI Lawsuits
A claim based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act" 3 is a frequently
mentioned alternative to equal protection challenges." 4 Title VI pro-
vides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
KENT L. REV. 1037, 1042 (1993) (commenting that modern racial barriers are more
subtle but "for most African Americans hardly less discriminatory than the Jim Crow
laws"); Boyle, supra note 23, at 950 (commenting that the "appearance of nonracism
is not the same as true nonracism"); cf supra note 87.
111 Lazarus, supra note 21, at 829; see Pettigrew, supra note 90, at 686-97 (sug-
gesting that even if some legal battles are won, "new patterns of racism" will raise
other problems).
112 The proposals for action by environmental justice advocates considered in this
part in no way constitutes an exhaustive list. Other proposals include: exploring the
possible use of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, Lazarus, supra note 21, at 839-42;
suggesting that legislation affecting the environment must be better "coordinated" at
the federal level, Chase, supra note 16, at 360-62; and using common law nuisance
suits, Walter Willard, Environmental Racism: The Merging of Civil Rights and Envi-
ronmental Activism, 19 S.U. L. REV. 77, 86-90 (1992).
The most promising alternatives yet advanced may be the use of state law claims.
See Reich, supra note 23, at 300-13. Because this Article is concerned with encourag-
ing the use of federal claims, it does not address state and local law alternatives.
113 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-4a (1988).
114 See, e.g., Jane Perkins, Recognizing and Attacking Environmental Racism, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 390 (1992) (discussing recent cases and their value as alterna-
tives for equal protection claims); Lazarus, supra note 21, at 834-39 (analyzing the
advantages and limitations of Title VI actions).
More recently, Minnesota Senator Paul Wellstone introduced the Public Health
Equity Act, S. 1841, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), which would apply Title VI language
to all federally financed programs affecting the environment. See Wellstone
Introduces Workplace Toxins Bill, O.S.H. Daily (BNA) (Feb. 16, 1994); "Eco-
Racism": Executive Order to Be Signed "Within Days", Greenwire, Feb. 10, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Grnwre File; Wellstone Bill Aims to Raise Resis-
tances, Greenwire, Feb. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Grnwre File.
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benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance." 115 Because the federal govern-
ment provides funding for a wide range of activities and entities, this
provision could be of great use to the environmental justice advocate, but
these claims require meticulous attention and considerable planning." 6
The principal advantage of Title VI lawsuits is that they may not
require proof of intentional discrimination. Lazarus notes that "[u]ntil
recently, it appeared fairly well settled that in the absence of a showing of
discriminatory intent, equitable relief was the only remedy available to
redress a Title VI violation.""' 7 Although he suggests other forms of
relief may be available in the future,"' equitable relief as a principal rem-
edy will not be enough for communities that have suffered the presence
of one or more toxic industries or activities over decades. For them, dam-
age to health and the habitability of their surroundings may already be
considerable.
However, even well planned Title VI lawsuits are not without their lim-
itations. Private industries or state-run enterprises that do not receive
federal assistance are beyond the reach of Title VI. For example, the
R.I.S.E. plaintiffs could not have used Title VI to block the siting of the
privately owned and operated King and Queen County, Virginia facil-
ity. 119 Thus, many commercial enterprises such as hazardous waste dispo-
sal firms, private lead smelters, or petrochemical production plants are
likely to be immune from Title VI attack.
Admittedly, this conclusion may be too pessimistic. Title VI covers all
federal agencies and federal environmental statutes provide funding to
state programs that carry out federally mandated environmental laws. 120
Lazarus argues that because federal environmental regulators play a key
role in the administration of state environmental laws, Title VI should
reach such state activities. 2 ' However, he may be minimizing possible
problems. For example, plans are currently afoot to site a massive haz-
ardous waste disposal facility in Noxubee County, Mississippi, twenty
miles across the border from Emelle, Alabama, the site of the nation's
115 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
116 See Perkins, supra note 114, at 390 ("These cases require the accumulation of
numerous facts and the compilation of a persuasive body of statistical proof. Expert
witnesses are also needed. Therefore, while Title VI may indeed form the basis for a
legal remedy, advocates should be aware that these claims should not be filed
haphazardly.").
117 Lazarus, supra note 21, at 836.
118 Id.
119 See supra part II.A.3.
120 See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 835.
121 Id.
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largest hazardous waste landfill.' The population of Noxubee County,
Mississippi is nearly 70% African-American.' z Until November 1993,
two private firms were competing for the permit to build the facility,
which will be awarded by the Mississippi Department of Environmental
Protection. 124
Thus, if the state awards the permit to a private entity, plaintiffs would
have to argue that the state's role in that process is sufficient to support a
Title VI claim. Despite its potential, this type of claim remains untested
and would require a court or administrative body to extend significantly
the reach of Title VI.125 This is not to say that Title VI claims will never
succeed, only that they may present greater difficulties than many com-
mentators have predicted.
126
B. Federal Legislation
Communities looking to safeguard themselves from environmental
harm could choose to put their resources into efforts to introduce or
amend legislation. However, both implementation and enforcement are
not likely to be immediate enough for the most environmentally belea-
122 Keith Schneider, Blacks Fighting Blacks on Plan for Dump Site, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1993, at A12.
123 Id.
124 Kevin Jones, Companies Court Noxubee County for Waste Site, Miss. Bus. J.,
Sept. 30, 1991, at 1.
125 On September 2, 1993, the New Orleans office of the Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund, Inc., filed a letter with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, objecting
to the administration of the State of Mississippi's Hazardous Waste Permitting Pro-
gram. Letter from Robert B. Wiygul, Staff Attorney, Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund, Inc., to United States Commission on Civil Rights (Sept. 2, 1993) (on file with
the Boston University Law Review). Sierra Club argued that Title VI prohibits dis-
crimination and that executive branch departments, including the EPA, are subject to
Title VI. Sierra Club then cited EPA regulations, which require a recipient of EPA
funds, such as Mississippi's Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), "not [to]
use criteria or methods of administering its program which have the effect of subject-
ing individuals to discrimination because of their race, [or] color." Id. at 6 (quoting 40
C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1992)) (emphasis added by Sierra Club). Sierra Club also alleged
that MDEQ's choice of Noxubee County, the population of which is overwhelmingly
African-American, had a discriminatory effect within the meaning of the regulations.
Id. at 10-11; see also supra note 114 (discussing Senator Wellstone's recent proposal).
126 Lazarus also suggests that "[clourts have upheld Title VI challenges to [some]
federally financed programs based on their racially disparate effects." Lazarus, supra
note 21, at 839. In doing so, he may be overestimating the precedential value of Title
VI claims for plaintiffs. In fact, the case to which he refers, Johnson v. City of Arca-
dia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978), involved the denial to Black neighborhoods
of the same municipal services received by White neighborhoods. However, courts
are likely to treat a case involving the denial of services as rather different from the
decision to permit the siting of an income-generating facility (as companies are sure to
characterize their activities).
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guered communities. In addition, most federal legislation proposed to
date has failed to adopt the lessons from the equal protection cases dis-
cussed above.' 2 7 For example, legislators have twice introduced an Envi-
ronmental Justice Act to Congress providing that 100 "Environmental
High Impact Areas" may be designated as "the 100 counties with the
highest total weight of toxic chemicals present during the course of the
most recent 5-year period for which data is available.' 12 The counties so
designated would merit special administrative and regulatory attention to
determine whether activities conducted inside them would affect the
environment in a way that is detrimental to the health and well-being of
their citizens.' 2 9 In the event that "significant adverse impacts of envi-
ronmental pollution on human health" are discovered in such areas, no
"new toxic chemical facility" may be sited in such an area, unless the
Secretary of Health and Human Services is shown that the activity is
needed and the proposed facility "demonstrates that it will minimize
uncontrolled releases into the environment."' 30
The Environmental Justice Act as proposed has at least two serious
limitations. First, arbitrary geographic divisions such as county lines or
other "appropriate geographic units" may not delineate endangered
areas with any precision, a recurring flaw in the equal protection cases
discussed in Part II. The equal protection cases also vividly demonstrate
the pitfalls of framing arguments based on such boundaries.' 31 Second,
even if there is a determination of environmental threat, the exceptions
noted above give companies considerable leeway that may permit future
siting of facilities in poor communities of color. Hazardous waste man-
agement companies currently spend considerable resources to demon-
strate that they will minimize environmental harm; they may be expected
to argue for an exception under the proposed Act just as vigorously.' 32
127 See supra part II.A.
128 H.R. 5326, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(2) (1992); H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 101(2) (1993). A companion bill, S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), largely
similar in substance, has been introduced by Senator Max E. Baucus. The bills are
basically similar, although both versions of the House bills include the requirement
that a moratorium on siting or permitting of toxic chemical facilities will take effect if
the Secretary's report identifies possible emissions at health-damaging levels. H.R.
5326, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1992); H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1993).
129 H.R. 5326 § 201; H.R. 2105 § 201.
130 H.R. 5326 § 403; H.R. 2105 § 403; see Reich, supra note 23, at 296-97.
131 See, e.g., supra notes 65-66 (noting the problems with using census tracts).
132 In the proposed siting in Noxubee County, Mississippi, for example, one of the
two companies vying for a permit there was estimated to have spent $12 million in less
than two years, much of it on sophisticated scientific modeling and risk assessment.
Mac Gordon, Environmental Technology Company Moving South, CLARION-LEDGER
(Jackson, Miss.), Feb. 19, 1993, at 5B.
Furthermore, as Barry Commoner argues, there is an inherent fallacy in the argu-
ment that a company will employ environmental harm minimization devices:
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Another legislative proposal is the Environmental Equal Rights Act of
1993,11 which would "amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to allow peti-
tions to be submitted to prevent certain waste facilities from being con-
structed in environmentally disadvantaged communities."' 4 This Act
would give citizens living in "environmentally disadvantaged communi-
ties" the right to petition the EPA Administrator-or the appropriate
state authority-for a hearing based on a belief that "the proposed facil-
ity may adversely affect-(i) the human health of such community or a
portion of such community; or (ii) the air, soil, water, or other elements
of the environment of such community or a portion of such commu-
nity."'3 5 At a hearing on the petition, the administrative law judge-or
state employee-may deny the petition if the respondent establishes
either that
there is no alternative location within the State for the proposed
facility that poses fewer risks to human health and the environment
than the proposed facility ... and ... the proposed facility ... will
not release contaminants; or ... will not engage in any activity that is
likely to increase the cumulative impact of contaminants on any resi-
dents of the environmentally disadvantaged community.'
36
As with the proposed Environmental Justice Act, the Environmental
Equal Rights Act, as written, is overly vulnerable to manipulation by
financially powerful waste management firms. For example, the statute
lacks criteria for determining whether any alternative location that may
be proposed at the hearing is viable or not, based on an evaluation of the
site's attendant environmental risks. Without such guidance, there is a
danger that firms could build persuasive cases based on voluminous sta-
tistical studies, including studies on the geological suitability of the origi-
nal site or other factors likewise alleged to reduce environmental risk. In
fact, this scenario is routine.13 7
"[Blecause the [pollution] control device is not perfect, continued increase in the pol-
lution-generating activity... will gradually overwhelm the device's limited ability to
improve environmental quality." COMMONER, supra note 58, at 43.
133 H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
134 Id.
135 Id. § 3.
136 Id.
'37 For example, Charles F. McDermott described the siting of the nation's largest
hazardous waste landfill, in Emelle, Alabama, as follows:
But the story of Emelle starts in 1974 when EPA conducted an audit of all the
counties in the United States, looking for the most protective locations for haz-
ardous waste land disposal facilities. EPA's auditors examined every county
against a fixed set of criteria, placing a premium on remote locations with access
to good transportation systems... with geologic conditions suitable for land dis-
posal, and with climate conditions that would naturally inhibit the amount of
precipitation that would come in contact with the waste.
Institute for Chemical Waste Management, Testimony Submitted by Charles J.
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Similarly, the Environmental Equal Rights Act lacks standards for
determining whether or not the proposed facility will "release contami-
nants" or engage in an increased "cumulative impact of contaminants" on
a community. For example, hazardous waste firms typically argue that
their incineration technologies are "99.9999%" safe.' 38 Without specific
statutory or regulatory standards, an administrative law judge may have
no way to evaluate either the safety value of that statistic or the danger, if
any, represented by the other 0.0001%.
One commentator proposed amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1990139 to "create a 'disparate impact' model of discrimination for haz-
ardous waste facility sitings aimed at the consequences of site selection,
rather than the motivations., 140 The goal of the amendment would be to
circumvent the required showing of intent that has derailed the equal
protection challenges. However, the amendment is troubling to many
because it seems to protect racial and ethnic minority communities over
White communities. This runs counter to current efforts to find a solu-
tion to the conflict between communities and hazardous waste disposal
firms that avoids further racial controversy or polarization. 14' By charac-
terizing the problem only in terms of race and not income as well, the
proposed amendment disregards the health and well-being of poor, White
communities. Reich, contemplating a similar measure after the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,142 concludes that any reform patterned
after or attempting to incorporate a disparate impact analysis for environ-
mental racial discrimination in Title VII would be a political landmine
McDermott to the House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights 10-11 (Mar. 3, 1993) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) [herein-
after McDermott Testimony].
138 A former waste company executive turned anti-incineration advocate calls this
"a gimmick." Telephone Interview with George Baggett (Aug. 10, 1993). An official
of the EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response-and agency whistle-
blower-says that many incinerators cannot meet the 99.9999% standard for PCBs
and dioxin. Telephone Interview with William Sanjour (July 28, 1993); see also COM-
MONER, supra note 58, at 116 (discussing the flawed methodology of waste firms,
which produce the 99.9999% safe figure).
139 S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
140 Godsil, supra note 22, at 422.
141 For example, Kaye Kiker, the co-founder of Alabamians for a Clean Environ-
ment (ACE) and a nationally-recognized leader in the grassroots campaign against
siting of commercial hazardous waste facilities, frequently tells audiences that the goal
is not for the waste to go somewhere else, but to rethink the entire system of produc-
tion and consumption. Telephone Interview with Kaye Kiker (Aug. 12, 1993); see also
Cole, supra note 12, at 645 & n.86 (observing that grassroots campaigns nationwide
have shifted industry's focus from pollution. control to prevention because of their
desire to spare all communities from toxic facilities).
142 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2, 16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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with severe enforcement problems. 143
Unfortunately, one of the most promising pieces of environmental jus-
tice legislation was stalled in committee and never enacted. The Commu-
nity and Residents Education at Hazardous Wastes Sites Act of 1992
(Education Act) would have amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act to
authorize the Administrator of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Dis-
ease Registry (ATSDR) "to conduct health studies at any hazardous
waste facility and take other actions with respect to risks posed by such
facility.' 44 If enacted, the bill would have compelled the ATSDR
Administrator to make plans for health assessments at hazardous waste
treatment, storage, or disposal facilities covered by the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act, focusing efforts on the highest-risk facilities.'45 In addition,
the bill would have created stringent peer review procedures for the
ATSDR and made education grants available to groups exposed to haz-
ardous wastes at studied sites. 146
The bill's strength lies in its recognition that communities must be
empowered to direct health studies on the effects of toxic exposure and
contamination upon them. Conversely, its weakness, like the other legis-
lation discussed in this section, is that its terms are too general. For
example, its public participation provision states that "[t]he ATSDR shall
involve the public in any health studies it carries out.' ' 147 Given the abys-
mal record of the ATSDR in addressing community health concerns, 148
this vaguely defined duty is of limited use. Furthermore, the funding of
$5 million per year would be inadequate. 49 Thus, even this promising
piece of legislation provides further support for the suggestion that envi-
ronmental justice advocates should attempt to complete health assess-
ments without government support. Nonetheless, the Education Act at
least is encouraging because it demonstrates an awareness of the need for
and current lack of money and attention devoted to medical monitoring
and health assessment in communities threatened by environmentally
dangerous activities.
143 Reich, supra note 23, at 295-96. Reich notes in particular that codification of a
disparate impact analysis was considered and rejected in the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
and the fact that the 1991 Act passed only because of unexpected political develop-
ments such as pressure on the Bush Administration to show greater support for civil
rights issues during the bruising confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas. Id.
144 H.R. 4571, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposing that community interests be
considered during the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, that residents be assisted in
understanding the health risks of these sites, and that further powers be given to the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry).
145 Id. § 2(K)(2).
146 Id. § 3.
147 Id. § 2(d)(1).
148 See infra note 240.
149 H.R. 4571, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 20).
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C. Political Action
The most promising avenue for environmental justice reform, in the
end, may be through community empowerment. Luke Cole's view of the
lawyer's role in promoting community action 5° and his ideal of commu-
nities mobilized to resist a diminished quality of life deserves serious con-
sideration.'51 Moreover, grassroots activists in several communities are
devising innovative ways to make their voices heard on environmental
matters.' 52 But Cole's conception of the lawyer-activist may not appeal to
those less-equipped for or inclined to activist political strategies. There-
fore, it is essential to isolate other, interim means to resist the continuing
degradation of the health of poor communities, and especially those of
color.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF CERCLA MEDICAL MONITORING LAWSUITS
For environmental justice advocates, what is the relevance of an effort
150 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
151 Cole is by no means alone in arguing that legal solutions are inadequate to
solve to environmental justice problems. See, e.g., YALE LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE
REPORT, EARTH RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILrIES: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION 29 (1992) ("Robert Bullard, although he felt that litigation is one
important tool for citizen group action, agreed . . . that those in pursuit of environ-
mental justice must also seek other means of taking effective action.").
152 For example, the New York City Department of Environmental Protection is
establishing an "environmental watchperson" to work with the badly polluted Green-
point-Williamsburg community. See GREENPOINT, supra note 103, at 14; Hernandez
Interview, supra note 103; see also Craig Quintana, No Minority Voice on Powerful
Panel: The Chairman of the Environmental Regulation Commission Wants the Gover-
nor to Name a Minority Member, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 1993, at B1 (report-
ing on the effort to name a racial or ethnic minority to Florida's powerful
Environmental Regulation Commission).
Legal academics currently are busy as well in exploring other alternatives. Laza-
rus's argument for incorporating distributional concerns in the rule-making process,
for example, is one possible avenue for increased involvement of burdened communi-
ties in the environmental decisions that will affect them. Lazarus, supra note 21, at
847. See generally id. at 839-52 (discussing the means of incorporating distributional
concerns within environmental law). Professor Vicki Been is in the process of explor-
ing the role that market dynamics play in the siting of locally undesirable land uses.
Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dispropor-
tionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1387 n.12 (1994). Such sug-
gestions deserve attention, notwithstanding Cole's worries about being co-opted by
the political process. However, because the focus of this Article is to identify one
tactic that can be of immediate use to the environmental justice advocate, it does not
discuss these promising but longer-term suggestions. Robert Bullard is in the process
of preparing a second edition of the People of Color Environmental Groups Direc-
tory, which will include a resource listing for various types of organizing being done
on these issues. Telephone Interview with Robert D. Bullard (Oct. 12, 1993).
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to revive the respectability of the CERCLA medical monitoring lawsuit?
Aside from any advantages to a community of color that might accrue by
including medical surveillance as part of a CERCLA cleanup action, what
benefits would follow for the future of a successful environmental justice
movement? There are several advantages to such an approach.
First, a principal advantage of the CERCLA medical monitoring claim
is its focus. In contrast to the equal protection challenges described in
Part II, a carefully tailored CERCLA medical monitoring claim is more
likely to be successful because of its narrow scope. Scientific studies
could help determine precisely the continuing extent of risk to human
health in order to determine the effectiveness of a CERCLA cleanup.
153
This would in turn further CERCLA's purpose of facilitating a prompt
and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites in order to protect the pub-
lic health and the environment. Furthermore, if properly constructed, the
medical monitoring claim could be less susceptible to interpretations of
geographically limited demographic data that avoid finding evidence of
invidious racial discrimination. Statistical information about the extent
and success of a cleanup could be collected by testing individuals living
within an appropriate geographical delimitation surrounding a cleanup
site and comparing them to individuals living in an area of comparable
size located further away from the site. Thus, a medical monitoring claim
could avoid the pitfalls of tactics already tried by environmental justice
advocates.
The data gained in this manner could also increase the likely success of
equal protection and other constitutional challenges by providing "demo-
graphic data within a particular radius of specific sites" so as to prove "a
pattern of discrimination sufficient to establish invidious intent."' 54
153 This suggestion could, in practice, be a useful means to allocate funds effi-
ciently, given the tendency of CERCLA cleanups to waste funds. See supra note 44
and accompanying text; see also Keith Schneider, Rules Easing for Urban Toxic
Cleanups, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at A12 (discussing the dissatisfaction of Michi-
gan residents with a cleanup that created more problems than it solved).
Medical monitoring could reduce costs to industry in the long run by identifying
injuries that may not manifest themselves until years later. Thus, the earlier the
detection, the earlier and less-expensive the treatment and cure. Also, by paying for
medical monitoring costs in the present, possible defendants could avoid fraudulent
claims in the future by ensuring that exposure to hazardous substances are contained
or at least rendered negligible.
Despite this reasoning, courts often seem reluctant to award medical monitoring
costs for fear that to do so will lead to corporate economic devastation. See, e.g., Ball
v. Joy Mfg., 755 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (rejecting plaintiffs' medical moni-
toring claim purely for economic reasons). Although the Ball court found meritori-
ous reasons for allowing individuals to recover the costs of medical monitoring, it held
that compensating plaintiffs when they had suffered no demonstrable injury could
devastate the corporate defendant. Id. at 1372.
154 Chase, supra note 16, at 358. Chase stresses that "additional data from a vari-
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Medical monitoring lawsuits are a means to do so without raising the
always difficult and politically charged determination of racial discrimina-
tion. As a strict liability statute, CERCLA does not require proof of
"moral misconduct."' 55 Statistical data also could be used to effect a
major jurisprudential shift in support of a winning equal protection claim.
Moreover, an illuminating statistical record developed through successful
medical monitoring lawsuits could invigorate the environmental justice
movement.
In addition to benefits in the judicial arena, medical monitoring claims
could help reap legislative rewards. For instance, CERCLA medical
monitoring data could increase the recognition of the problem by
Whites.' Gradual accumulation of data could force Whites (and non-
Whites) in control of the nation's policy-making organs to take notice of
the disproportionate environmental poverty of Blacks and other persons
of color. Conversely, by providing poor communities of color with statis-
tical ammunition, this data will provide local residents and grassroots
activists with persuasive evidence that the long-term costs of siting will be
anything but minimal. Moreover, while health effect studies have been
conducted mostly on White male workers,' 57 CERCLA medical monitor-
ing data may significantly expand the available racial and ethnic informa-
tion regarding workplace health.5 8
The timeliness of asserting CERCLA medical monitoring lawsuits is
great. Industry has a formidable public relations arsenal at its command
and has begun to divert the momentum of the environmental justice
movement. A medical record of the impact of industry activities would
enable environmental justice lawyers to counter industry claims.' 5 9
ety of sources are needed to adequately address the issues presented by environmen-
tal racism [including] information on health effects of environmental hazards,
specifically the relationship between environmental hazards and the health status of
minorities." Id. He also considers some of the possible uses and law reform conse-
quences of such data. Id. at 358-60; see also infra note 242.
155 See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 49, at 34.
156 See Pettigrew, supra note 90, at 686 (pointing out that Black poverty remains
largely outside the purview of Whites); cf. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BorTOM OF
THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RAcISM 8-10, 158-194 (1992) (noting the "stabiliz-
ing" role of Blacks in the United States and White resistance to the improvement of
Blacks' lives). Incidentally, testing would offer the incremental benefit of aiding in
the effort to accumulate information on a national scale to track the impact of toxic
activities on the communities where they are conducted, particularly poor communi-
ties of color.
157 Chase, supra note 16, at 349.
158 Id. at 358.
159 Consider WMX Corporation, which until 1993 was known as Waste Manage-
ment, Inc., the country's largest pollution control corporation. WMX has assigned
Charles McDermott, its top Government Affairs' officer, to tackle environmental jus-
tice issues. In his testimony before the House Judiciary's Subcommittee on Civil and
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Constitutional Rights on March 3, 1993, he announced that WMX accepts "the prem-
ise that environmental assets and liabilities in this country are not evenly distributed
among racial groups, ethnic minorities or economic groups." McDermott Testimony,
supra note 137, at 2. However, McDermott then tried to deflect attention from the
hazardous waste management industry and focus it instead on industrial waste gener-
ators by asserting that "the entire commercial hazardous waste industry handles only
3% of the hazardous waste generated in this country. The other 97% is handled on
site by the entity that generates it." Id. at 3. Although the commercial hazardous
waste industry likes to deflect attention from itself by citing such statistics, these argu-
ments are really beside the point if, nonetheless, statistics also indicate that "minor-
ity" communities disproportionately bear the burden and stigma of "hosting" facilities
to handle the 3%. Moreover, it is useful to recall that the Commission Report deals
not only with commercial sites but also uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. See COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. This should concern the environmental justice
advocate because without its own body of statistical knowledge and evidence, the
movement will be forced into a position of responding to an agenda drafted by indus-
try rather than asking industry to address the issues most important to the movement.
More troubling still, McDermott's remarks evidence the willingness of a company
like his to exploit racial tensions. For example, McDermott insisted that companies
like WMX were part of the solution in addressing the problem of lead contamination
of housing stock and soils. McDermott Testimony, supra note 137, at 6. He then
described how the EPA contracted his company to remove lead-contaminated soils
from a
predominantly Black housing development in West Dallas.... As the soils began
to arrive at our landfill in Louisiana, which is located in a community which is
predominantly white, local residents rose in opposition to wastes coming in from
out-of-state. This could have been an opportunity for the environmental equity
movement to bring health- and science-based arguments to bear against the paro-
chial interests that commonly object to moving wastes between states.
Id. at 6-7. He concluded that "we are hopeful that open discussion will some day
soon create coalitions between advocates and remedial service companies." Id.
Unfortunately, the scenario McDermott is advocating in effect asks communities of
color to pit themselves against "predominantly White" communities. In addition, his
emphasis on the Louisiana community's racial demographics is disingenuous:
Although the area may be largely White, the Black population is substantial. The
Louisiana facility, operated by a WMX subsidiary, is located in Lake Charles, which is
in Calcasieu Parish. One survey rates Calcasieu Parish as among the highest in the
nation for several measures of toxic and pollution hazards. BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN,
THE TRUTH ABOUT WHERE You LIVE 143, 175, 191, 193, 195, 201, 205, 211, 221
(1991). According to the 1990 U.S. Census, Calcasieu Parish was over 30% Black, the
fourth-largest Black population in Louisiana. It also had Louisiana's fourth-largest
Hispanic population. Census Bureau Delivers Louisiana's 1990 Census Counts, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, at *7-9, Feb. 5, 1991, available in WESTLAW, Cendata
Database (search TI field for "Census Bureau Delivers" and ST field for "Louisi-
ana"). As the Commission Report documents, socio-economic status is a factor-
although not the most significant one-related to the location of toxic activities.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at xiii. Therefore, it is likely that the White com-
munities against which McDermott suggests the West Dallas community marshall
"health- and science-based arguments" are not economically prosperous.
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Above all, CERCLA medical monitoring lawsuits would allow the
environmental justice community to begin to view existing environmental
legislation as a potential benefit to their cause. As discussed above, Cole
argues that environmental statutes legitimate the pollution of low-income
neighborhoods, and that the manner in which the political and economic
elite manipulate environmental laws has resulted in poor people bearing
a disproportionate share of the nation's environmental hazards. 160 This
need not be the case. The CERCLA medical monitoring claim is one
strategy currently available for environmental justice advocates to bring
wider public attention to what Cole calls the grassroots environmental-
ists' "far more radical and systemic [than mainstream environmentalists']
view of the changes needed to eliminate pollution."'' Such claims would
focus attention on the harm caused by past toxic activities to the physical
health and welfare of communities of color and force a corresponding
reexamination of environmental priorities that may be the result of envi-
ronmental groups' past compromises with industry and government.'62
The compromises to which Cole refers include the tendency of negotia-
tions about environmental management to be reduced to arguments
"about how many parts per million of certain chemicals are 'safe' for
release into the atmosphere."' 63 He points out that certain "citizens'
groups are pressing for the elimination of the chemicals themselves and
arguing for a change in the processes that produce these chemicals in the
first place."' 64 Cole might contend that designing a legal strategy includ-
ing the tactical use of CERCLA medical monitoring claims will only put
environmental justice advocates in the position of having to compromise,
by forcing them to haggle over how many parts per million of a certain
chemical should be deemed hazardous to their health. Thus, he might
argue, environmental justice advocates would risk losing sight of their
overarching goal of changing the fundamental terms of the environmental
debate-effectively focusing on the trees at the expense of the forest. 165
Such a criticism would, however, misunderstand the nature and pur-
pose of the CERCLA medical monitoring claim advanced in this Article.
CERCLA medical monitoring lawsuits should be explored as one of pos-
sibly several promising steps that could help effect the larger goal of shift-
ing the terms of the nation's environmental improvement efforts, just as
Cole and others have urged. Moreover, the accumulation of information
160 Cole, supra note 12, at 642.
161 Id. at 644.
162 See, e.g., id. (discussing pollution prevention as an alternative to pollution
control).
163 Id.; see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
164 Cole, supra note 12, at 644.
165 A common concern is that by agreeing to work "within the system," those most
oppressed by it end up strengthening the institutions that serve most to thwart their
aspirations. See, e.g., id. at 652 (citing Crenshaw, supra note 5, at 1366-69).
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through medical monitoring and surveillance could well heighten local
involvement in environmental issues, as communities become more
informed about the impact of toxic activities upon them and promote the
radical reexamination of environmental laws that Cole favors.
166
Finally, if advanced by environmental justice reformers, CERCLA
medical monitoring claims could have the positive result of further break-
ing down the barriers of specialization that have separated the civil rights
and poverty law bars from the environmental law bar.' 67 Environmental
lawyers need to be "empowered" in their own right to understand how
their efforts might be used in service of the environmental justice
cause. 168
V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT AND LESSONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE ADVOCATE
A. Background
Much of the dispute about CERCLA medical monitoring turns on the
interpretation of the phrase "necessary costs of response" in section
107(a)(4)(B).' 69 As courts routinely note with frustration, the phrase is
nowhere defined in the statute.' 70 However, "response" is defined as
"remove, removal, remedy, and, remedial action.' 7' "Remove" and
''removal" are defined as
[t]he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the
environment, such actions as may be necessary [sic] taken in the
166 Changes in peoples' condition often come about only if the people themselves
act. See, e.g., id. at 649.
167 Cole adverts to this division and describes the genesis of what might be called
the "scienticization" of the environmental bar. Id. at 634-36; see Lazarus, supra note
21, at 788. This division is widely identified not only in the legal community, but more
generally in the environmental and civil rights' communities. See Charles Jordan &
Donald Snow, Diversification, Minorities, and the Mainstream Environmental Move-
ment, in VOICES, supra note 12, at 75-79 (discussing the historical roots of this
division).
168 Cole describes one shortcoming of the social reform lawyers as their failure to
distinguish between serving an ideal and furthering their actual clients' needs. Cole,
supra note 12, at 652-54. This Article aims to delineate an opportunity for using an
existing statutory alternative not only in the service of the client community, but also
as a way to advance progress towards the ideal of environmental justice.
169 See William B. Johnson, Annotation, What Are "Necessary Costs of Response"
Within Meaning of § 107(a)(4)(B) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 USCS § 9607(a)(4)(B)), 113 A.L.R. FED.
1, 45-55 (1993) (discussing cases involving the recovery of medical monitoring costs).
170 See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992); Artesian
Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988); Avnet, Inc. v.
Allied Signal, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 n.7 (D.R.I. 1992).
171 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988).
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event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the envi-
ronment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the
disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as
may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the
public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise
result from a release or threat of release. 172
Furthermore, "remedy" and "remedial action" are, in turn, defined as
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or
in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or
minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not
migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health
or welfare or the environment.
173
Thus, the statute's key definitions for purposes of understanding what
costs are recoverable "costs of response" both link protection of "public
health or welfare" with "environment."
Early decisions interpreting CERCLA affirmed that the category of
recoverable costs of response under the statute is extremely broad, leav-
ing defenses to recovery correspondingly limited. 174 Despite early recog-
nition of CERCLA's broad sweep, in the medical monitoring context
courts have increasingly tried to cut back on CERCLA's expansive recov-
ery provisions.
Decisions disallowing medical monitoring are both confusing and
troubling. The decisions confuse because they run counter to the stat-
ute's express purpose-to protect human health, welfare, and the envi-
ronment-made clear in the definitions quoted above. The trend of
these cases is troubling because their logical result is to formulate law
that protects the environment but tolerates the demise of those who
inhabit it. This dichotomy is anathema to the environmental justice
reformer because it recognizes an "environment" distinct from the people
who inhabit it.
Therefore, this Article argues that, for several reasons, the necessary
costs of response in CERCLA cost recovery actions include medical
monitoring costs. First, the prevailing trend of CERCLA medical moni-
toring cases, which hold that medical monitoring is not a necessary cost of
response, rests upon a thin analytical foundation. In particular, the cases
172 Id. § 9601(23).
173 Id. § 9601(24).
174 Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 596 F. Supp. 283, 287
(N.D. Ca. 1984) ("Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by
the disposal of chemical poisons bear the cost and responsibility for remedying the
harmful conditions they created." (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem.
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982))).
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rely upon the inexplicably narrow reading of section 107(a)(4)(B)
advanced in a single federal district court case.
175
Second, the reasoning in the cases that disallow CERCLA medical
monitoring is analogous to the reasoning in the failed equal protection
challenges discussed in Part II. Just as in the equal protection cases the
courts construed census tracts and county lines and other geographical
and administrative demarcations to avoid finding invidious discrimination
against racial "minorities," so too the cases disallowing CERCLA medi-
cal monitoring follow twists and turns of logic that avoid recovery of costs
clearly within CERCLA's scope. Moreover, just as the Bean court
expressed some discomfort with the justice of its result,176 several courts
reviewing CERCLA medical monitoring claims have evidenced a nagging
sense that they have not reached the correct results.177 Perhaps wary of
the possible social and redistributional consequences of allowing such
response costs, the courts have shied away from endorsing medical moni-
toring claims.
At the heart of this misapplication of CERCLA's broad statutory
scheme is a misunderstanding of the meaning of "medical monitoring."
CERCLA medical monitoring cases indicate that courts routinely con-
fuse monitoring with diagnosis and treatment. Medical monitoring may
lead in many cases to the diagnosis and eventual treatment of medical
problems. However, in the context of a CERCLA cost recovery action,
monitoring would enhance cleanup efforts by focusing on the greatest
threats to the public health and the environment.
Because this Article recommends an approach that differentiates medi-
cal monitoring costs from other medical expenses, it is necessary to elabo-
rate on what is meant by the term "medical monitoring" in this context.
Medical monitoring consists of series of tests such as blood, urine, and
tissue sampling and analysis that medical professionals administer over a
prescribed period of time to a targeted population. This Article assumes
that the targeted population will be of sufficiently small size to measure
most possibly affected individuals. Because the appropriate monitoring
response will change depending on the nature of the substances to which
a population has been exposed, it is impossible to be more precise here as
to what "medical monitoring" means. Furthermore, such a term is open
to interpretation and scientific debate. 178 However, this should not be
175 Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
see discussion infra part V.B.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
177 See, e.g., Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1249 (M.D. Pa. 1991); infra
part V.C.2.
178 The suggestion that such monitoring may yield uncertain results is no criticism
of the value of conducting such studies. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GREENBERG & RICH-
ARD F. ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: THE CREDIBILITY GAP 98 (1984)
(summarizing the inconclusive findings of the Love Canal studies on health impacts).
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used to support an argument against the practice, but rather should be
used to encourage debate about the proper means to achieve CERCLA's
purpose of protecting public health or welfare, or the environment.
Finally, the task of making the distinction between medical monitoring
and medical diagnosis and treatment ultimately falls to the environmental
justice advocate. Due to the courts' hostility to allowing recovery for
medical treatment expenses, the advocate would probably do best to seek
only medical monitoring and surveillance costs, indicating that the activi-
ties will serve CERCLA cleanup efforts. At a minimum, if for reasons of
expediency or expense it is necessary to seek medical treatment costs in
the same action, they should be clearly separated from requests to
recover CERCLA medical monitoring costs. The pitfall, as the following
analysis of the case law reveals, is that courts may implicitly link monitor-
ing with treatment, and therefore disallow both.
B. Putting Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp. 79 in Context
The most influential case in shaping opposition to allowing medical
monitoring costs as "necessary costs of response" under CERCLA is
Coburn. Other courts, including the only federal appellate court yet to
have considered this issue, have adopted wholesale the Coburn court's
analysis of the arguments against CERCLA medical monitoring. 80
Although cases routinely assert Coburn's "in[-]depth analysis,"181 a close
reading of Coburn confirms that it is less soundly reasoned than so many
courts have claimed.
Coburn involved a class action by "all persons who were exposed to
well water contaminated with TCE [trichloroethylene] and other hazard-
ous substances released" from the defendants' property in Dublin, Penn-
On the contrary, increased monitoring will help to achieve the goal of refining health
assessment techniques. This is sorely needed, especially given that a U.S. General
Accounting Office study concluded that sites on CERCLA's National Priorities List
lacked necessary health risk studies. See FRED SET-rERBERG & LONNY SHAVELSON,
Toxic NATION 169 (1993); see also supra part I.D.
179 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
180 Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1992); see infra part
V.C.1; see also Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
("Rather than add unnecessarily to the length of this Order, the Court adopts that
portion of [Coburn,] which discusses CERCLA response costs"); States v. BFG Elec-
troplating & Mfg. Co., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350, 1352 (1990) ("[W]e agree with
and adopt, as has at least one other court, the reasoning and conclusion reached in
Coburn .... "); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 418 (M.D. Pa. 1989)
("Rather than add unnecessarily to the length of this Memorandum, the court will
simply adopt the rationale of the Coburn court as its own.").
181 See, e.g., Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (rely-
ing on the Coburn court's analysis to conclude that medical-related costs are not
recoverable under CERCLA).
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sylvania. 182 The class included people who either resided or worked near
the defendants' property. 183 In moving to dismiss the suit, the defendants
contended in part "that costs of medical screening and/or future medical
monitoring are not 'necessary costs of response' as that term is defined in
CERCLA."' 84
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania agreed with the defendants' formulation of the issue and
examined the split among federal district courts. It began by examining
cases disallowing medical monitoring, particularly Chaplin v. Exxon
Corp. 8 5 The court drew from Chaplin the conclusion that while the
House and Senate bills that eventually became CERCLA "contained lan-
guage imposing liability for personal injury as well as medical expenses
and economic loss, these specific liability provisions were deleted from
the final compromise bill which became CERCLA.' 1 6 Thus, early in its
decision to disallow medical monitoring costs, the court adopted the
Chaplin court's unfounded equation of medical monitoring and surveil-
lance costs with personal injury and economic loss.
In this vein, Coburn, Chaplin, and subsequent cases quote CERCLA's
notoriously thin and unreliable legislative history 8 7 to the effect that the
final bill had deleted a federal cause of action for " 'medical expenses or
property or income loss.' "188 In fact, CERCLA's legislative history
might also support allowing medical monitoring damages. The drafters
intended removal costs to include "monitoring for spread of the hazard-
ous substances: biological and other monitoring to determine the extent
of contamination."' 18 9
The Coburn court approvingly cited Chaplin for the proposition that
182 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1666.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 1667. The plaintiffs may have hurt themselves by asking for the costs of
the" 'taking of such actions as [were] necessary to prevent, minimize or mitigate dam-
age to their health or welfare.'" Id. (quoting Plaintiffs' Complaint 49). This may
have focused the court's attention away from medical monitoring per se. Although
this pleading choice is based on CERCLA's language, it has repeatedly been a thorn
in the side of plaintiffs' counsel seeking compensation for medical monitoring costs.
See infra text accompanying notes 215-20.
185 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2009 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (concluding that CERCLA
precludes recovery of medical monitoring expenses).
186 Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1668.
187 See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Exxon v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 373 (1986)); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233,
1246 n.16 (M.D. Pa. 1990) ("[T]he legislative history is the weakest link in the deci-
sion.... Because of its varied and extensive record of passage, the use of CERCLA's
legislative history has its limits.").
188 Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1670 (quoting the compromise bill's co-
sponsor, Senator Jennings Randolph, 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980)).
189 S. REP. No. 848, supra note 49, at 54.
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when Congress amended CERCLA in 1986,190 it addressed the extent to
which CERCLA would deal with medical matters by expanding the
authority of the ATSDR. 191 Thus, the Coburn court articulated the two
main arguments against medical monitoring and surveillance costs under
CERCLA, namely: (1) the characterization of medical monitoring costs
as requests for personal and economic loss damages'92 and (2) the claim
that the ATSDR is a congressional response to calls for medical
monitoring.
The Coburn court next considered cases supporting the availability of
medical monitoring costs under CERCLA, most notably Brewer v.
Ravan,193 but dismissed them as "unpersuasive."' 94 In particular, Coburn
criticized Brewer's conclusion that " '[p]ublic health related medical tests
and screening clearly are necessary to "monitor, assess, [or] evaluate a
release,"' "'95 arguing that this
contravenes the plain meaning of that phrase. Quite simply, we find
it difficult to understand how future medical testing and monitoring
of persons who were exposed to contaminated well water prior to the
remedial measures currently underway will do anything to "monitor,
assess, [or] evaluate a release" of contamination from the site. 196
This statement, the core of Coburn's analysis, bears scrutiny for several
reasons. First, it assumes that there will be no release of toxins while
cleaning up the site. Second, its disregard for situations in which people
may have been contaminated prior to the commencement of remedial
measures shows a disturbing willingness to use CERCLA to clean up the
"environment" but not benefit the people who inhabit it. Third, the
statement gives a new spin to the meaning of the word "evaluate." After
all, it is reasonable to argue that monitoring is a form of evaluation.
Fourth, the court's analysis supports a view contrary to the statutory goal
of remedial actions under CERCLA. By contrast to short-term, removal
actions, CERCLA remedial actions are intended to be long-term clean-
ups.' 97 Nonetheless, the Coburn court concluded that medical monitor-
190 SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
191 Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1670 (citing Chaplin, 25 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 2012, and 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1988)); see also infra note 240.
192 Perhaps this reflects the court's skittishness about the ultimate redistributional
implications of awarding medical monitoring costs.
193 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); see discussion infra part V.D.
194 Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1670.
195 Id. at 1671 (quoting Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179).
196 Id. The court thus folded the language of CERLCA's removal definition
("monitor, assess, and evaluate") into a statement about remedial action, suggesting
that it did not clearly understand the differences between the two types of response
costs.
197 See United States v. Rohm, 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993); General Elec. Co. v.
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ing, a long-term response to a toxic contamination, is disallowed under
CERCLA.
C. The Misplaced Reliance on Coburn
1. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co.'98
In Daigle, the only federal appellate court to address the issue of CER-
CLA medical monitoring costs, the Tenth Circuit endorsed Coburn's
"comprehensive analysis." Daigle arose out of a cleanup at the Rocky
Mountain Arsenal, a federally-controlled CERCLA site outside Denver,
Colorado.'99 Members of the plaintiff class resided near the Arsenal. As
in Coburn, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.200 The district court
denied the motion, holding that medical monitoring claims might consti-
tute "necessary costs of response."' '
The Tenth Circuit reversed, observing that "[t]his type of action has
been increasingly recognized by state courts as necessary given the latent
nature of many diseases caused by exposure to hazardous materials and
the traditional common law tort doctrine requirement that an injury be
manifest."2 2 However, it agreed with the Coburn court that CERCLA
did not permit any recovery for medical monitoring costs.203
Although the Daigle court took care to quote in full CERCLA's statu-
tory definitions of "remove" or "removal" and "remedy" or "remedial,"
it nonetheless followed Coburn's lead in assuming that medical monitor-
ing does not play a role in containing, cleaning up, preventing, or mini-
mizing a release of hazardous substances: "Plaintiffs and the Brewer court
go awry in affording a broad sweep to the 'public health and welfare'
language in the definitions."204 The court concluded that while
"[m]edical monitoring would mitigate the potential individual health
problems of Plaintiffs .... the general provision for prevention or mitiga-
tion of 'damage to public health or welfare' must be interpreted consist-
ently with the specific examples of 'removal costs' enumerated in the
definition." '205
The Daigle court marshaled unspecified canons of statutory construc-
Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1419 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
cleanup lasting more than one year may constitute a remedial action under CER-
CLA), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 937 (1991).
198 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992). For a recent discussion of Daigle, see Sweeney,
supra note 38.
199 Id. at 1530.
200 Id. at 1531. The United States Government, also a defendant, joined the
motion to dismiss.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1533.
203 Id. at 1535-37.
204 Id. at 1535.
205 Id.
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tion in a manner reminiscent of the way the East Bibb Twiggs court
played with demographic concepts to avoid finding discriminatory
intent.2 °6 In both cases, the courts ignored available-but inconve-
nient-evidence suggesting the appropriateness of a contrary result.
The certainty of the Daigle court's pronouncement is debatable. CER-
CLA was, by design, a statute drafted to have a broad sweep with respect
to protection of the public health or welfare, or the environment. 20 7
Moreover, the list of specific examples of "removal costs" enumerated in
its definition is nonexclusive.2 °8 The Daigle court nonetheless held that it
is "only reasonable under traditional statutory canons of construction to
conclude that any other recoverable costs must at least be of a similar
type., 20 9 The canon of statutory construction on which the court sug-
gested that it relied was "ejusdem generis," which requires that other
examples be of like kind or class. 210 Even assuming the appropriateness
of this analysis, the argument falters. The court concluded that "[l]ong[-]
term health monitoring of the sort requested by Plaintiffs-'to assist
plaintiffs and class members in the prevention or early detection and
treatment of chronic disease,' . . . clearly has nothing to do with prevent-
ing contact between 'a release or threatened release' and the public. The
release has already occurred." '211
This analysis is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons, both of which
stem from the incorrect assumption that a cleanup renders a site perma-
nently harmless. First, even under a "like kind or class" analysis, based
upon the application of ejusdem generis, the court did not satisfactorily
distinguish security fencing or temporary housing from medical monitor-
ing. Is it not conceivable that medical monitoring could provide informa-
tion to help prevent a future release just as a security fence may provide
the public with protection from a release? Medical monitoring could
show that even after the completion of a phase of a cleanup, toxics levels
206 See supra part II.A.2.
207 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988); COOKE, supra note 30, § 12.03[4][c].
208 " 'Remove' or 'removal' means the cleanup or removal of released hazardous
substances from the environment .... The term includes, in addition, without being
limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative
water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not
otherwise provided for . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (emphasis added).
209 Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
210 "Ejusdem generis" is defined as "[o]f the same kind, class, or nature" such that
"where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things, the gen-
eral words will be construed as applying only to things of the same general class as
those enumerated." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990). The court drew
this analysis from Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1247 n.17 (M.D. Pa.
1990). However, the Daigle court was not at all clear as to what canon it relied upon.
Instead, it stated only that it relied upon "traditional" canons of construction.
211 Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535 (citations omitted).
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were still unacceptably high in the tissues or bloodstreams of local resi-
dents, indicating an incomplete cleanup or continuing releases.
Second, it is unclear why the court was concerned only with preventing
other releases. The statutory definition of "removal" refers not only to
prevention but also to cleanup.212 At least at the summary judgment
stage, it is unclear why medical monitoring would not serve this purpose.
Similarly, the removal definition provides that removal may also include
actions "to monitor, assess and evaluate '' 213 such releases, as well as
measures to minimize and mitigate damages in case of a release or the
threat of one. 14 For purposes of summary judgment, it is unclear why
medical monitoring could not be considered as a possible method to
achieve these ends, and it is difficult to explain in the longer term why
medical monitoring is an inappropriate means to satisfy the statute's pur-
pose of monitoring, assessing, and evaluating releases.
The environmental justice advocate should therefore clarify how medi-
cal monitoring and surveillance expenses are appropriate CERCLA
recovery costs by emphasizing their role in protecting the public health or
welfare, or the environment in cleanups. The advocate should also spec-
ify that medical monitoring will not involve medical treatment, although
such treatment may be a necessary consequence of the medical monitor-
ing data.
The Daigle court's conclusion that medical monitoring was inappropri-
ate because "[t]he release has already occurred, 2 15 hints at the court's
real view of the matter: Medical monitoring is compensation for personal
damage or economic loss, as opposed to a means of arresting continuing
threats to health, welfare, or the environment. The court went on to
observe that the plaintiffs' medical monitoring "smacks of a cause of
action for damages resulting from personal injury. ,216 The court appar-
ently assumed that compensation for medical monitoring expenses would
compensate for personal harm instead of furthering CERCLA's goal of
environmental cleanup. Aside from separating the "environment" from
the people who inhabit it, the court's conclusion warrants criticism for
failing to consider that medical monitoring is not medical treatment, and
that monitoring may provide valuable information about the progress of
CERCLA cleanups.
The plaintiffs' decision to seek compensation for early detection, pre-
vention, and treatment of chronic disease may have influenced the court's
212 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23); see supra note 172 and accompanying text.
213 Id.
214 "Removal" specifically includes "the taking of such other actions as may be
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or
to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or the threat of
release." Id.
216 Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
216 Id.
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decision not to award medical monitoring costs. 217 Although it is unclear
from the prima facie language of the statute whether prevention and
treatment satisfy CERCLA's mandate to protect public health or welfare,
or the environment,218 it is politically more difficult to characterize treat-
ment as a part of cleanup and not as a means to compensate for personal
damage. 219 In retrospect, the plaintiffs' emphasis "on the additional
§ 9601(23) phrase referring to 'other actions as may be necessary to pre-
vent, minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare . .
was probably mistaken.220
Environmental justice lawyers seeking medical monitoring costs should
base their claims on both the above-quoted provision and the provisions
defining long-term remedial actions, which state that the purpose of these
actions is "to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so
that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment., 221 This strategy is logically
compelling because much medical monitoring will be in the nature of a
long-term remedy to ensure the prevention, minimization, or removal of
hazardous substances accumulation.
Despite the plaintiffs' error in seeking compensation for treatment, the
Daigle court may be further criticized for reaching its decision on what it
recognized was a "limited construction of the definition of 'response
costs.' ,222 Although the court followed the plaintiffs' lead in considering
only the definition of removal costs, it also could have considered the
possibility of medical monitoring as a long-term remedial action. How-
ever, the court made quite clear its view that medical monitoring was
217 Id.
218 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
219 The justification for omitting personal health costs from the broad statutory
injunction to protect public health and the environment is taken from statements in
the legislative history suggesting that Congress did not intend CERCLA to become a
toxic tort recovery statute. See, e.g., Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1238
(M.D. Pa. 1990) (stating that Congress did not intend CERCLA as "a general vehicle
for toxic tort actions"; rather, the Act was designed to spend the limited funds avail-
able for cleanup actions efficiently). However, efforts to recover for property damage
under CERCLA continue. See, e.g., Recent Developments, [1993 News & Analysis]
23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,555, 10,555 (Sept. 1993) ("[C]itizens residing near
a former Superfund site, now the location of a wood treatment plant, may not recover
CERCLA response costs or damages for diminution in property values, despite the
presence of hazardous substances on their land, because they failed to establish the
release of a hazardous substance." (citing Stewman v. Mid-South Wood Prods. of
Mena, Inc., 993 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1993))).
220 Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535. Plaintiffs contended that this phrase should be read
broadly "to cover any type of monitoring that would mitigate health problems." Id.
221 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
222 Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
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neither a removal nor a remedial cost.22
3
Furthermore, the Daigle court quoted the legislative history to estab-
lish that Congress did not intend to use CERCLA as a means to compen-
sate for personal damage or economic loss.224 Following Coburn, the
court also suggested that the ATSDR is a means to assess "health effects
of actual and threatened hazardous substance releases. 225
2. Ambrogi v. Gould226
In Ambrogi, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania expanded upon the questionable logic of Coburn, articulat-
ing a more detailed rationale for the proposition that medical monitoring
and surveillance expenses are not recoverable as "necessary costs of
response" under CERCLA. This expansion of Coburn's logic presents
serious obstacles to anyone interested in commencing a CERCLA medi-
cal monitoring lawsuit.
In Ambrogi, citizens living near a battery processing plant alleged that
the plant had put them at risk of lead contamination.227 After briefly
outlining CERCLA's scope, the court stated that "[iun passing [CER-
CLA],... Congress did not intend to make injured parties whole or to
create a general vehicle for toxic tort actions. ' 228 After surveying the
case law on both sides of the issue, the court followed Coburn, conclud-
ing that because CERCLA's nonexclusive list of remedial actions did not
include the word "medical," the statute did not contemplate recovery for
any such costs. 2 2
9
The court also followed Coburn in finding that CERCLA's "removal"
definition "should logically be confined to activities of the same kind as
223 Id. As the court explained,
[a~lthough the statute provides that "removal" costs are not limited to these spe-
cific examples, we think it only reasonable under traditional statutory canons of
construction to conclude that any other recoverable costs must at least be of a
similar type .... Longterm health monitoring of the sort requested by Plaintiffs
... clearly has nothing to do with a "release or threatened release" and the
public. The release has already occurred.
Id. (citations omitted).
224 Id. ("[Tihe history of the enactment of CERCLA reveals that both houses of
Congress considered and rejected any provision for recovery of private damages unre-
lated to the cleanup effort, including medical expenses.").
225 Id. at 1536. But see discussion infra note 240.
226 750 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
227 Id. at 1236-37. For an introductory bibliography on the toxicity of lead, see
Colin Crawford, Trends in the Regulation of Lead, 2 ENv-rL. L. N.Y. 145 (1991), and
compare COMMONER, supra note 58, at 22-26, 37-42 (reporting a general decline in
levels of lead pollution); supra note 159; infra note 233.
228 Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1238.
229 Id. at 1246-47 (stating that, as the definition of "removal" did not specify medi-
cal monitoring, these costs were not included in the statute).
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those enumerated by the more specific items identified in the latter half
of the definition."2' The court offered no authority supporting its
view,231 other than stating that "[t]his conclusion would also comport
with the overall purpose of the legislation and is in balance with the con-
temporary history surrounding the enactment of CERCLA. ' 232
This assumption is only correct, however, if one characterizes medical
monitoring as recovery for economic loss or personal damages. The
Ambrogi court's argument makes exactly this assumption, as indicated by
the admonition that CERCLA "is not to be used.., as a universal solu-
tion to all ills that originate from a hazardous waste site. '233 The environ-
mental justice advocate need not disagree with this statement, but may
respond that CERCLA was intended to promote the public health and
welfare, and also to clean up the environment, and that monitoring the
health of those exposed to contaminated sites is one effective means to
serve these ends. The advocate should further remind the judge that this
conclusion is supported by CERCLA's plain statutory language. 3 4
Moreover, the Ambrogi court's opinion suggests that plaintiffs were
not attempting to construe CERCLA so broadly. On the contrary, the
opinion states that plaintiffs sought to recover the costs of "medical sur-
veillance, health effect studies, and health assessments." 23 5  These
230 Id. at 1247.
231 The court claimed to derive its reasoning from the principle of ejusdem generis,
but did not actually employ that principle. See id.; supra notes 210-12 and accompa-
nying text.
232 Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1247.
233 Id. at 1248. The court further observed that CERCLA "was enacted 'as a legis-
lative response to the growing problem of toxic wastes, many of which were disposed
of before their dangers were widely unknown [sic] and had contaminated precious
land and water resources.'" Id. at 1247 (quoting Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle
County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1285 (D. Del. 1987)). In the context of a case involving
contamination from a lead battery processing plant, this observation is inaccurate.
The knowledge about the dangers of lead is ancient. Novelist and chemist Primo Levi
wrote of a lead merchant: "[B]ut right there was the lead: I felt it under my feet,
turbid, poisonous, and heavy... my hands and knees have begun to shake, and my
teeth and gums have turned blue .... ." PRIMO LEVI, THE PERIODIC TABLE 95 (1984);
see, e.g., Children at Risk, 278 NATURE 1253 (1970); Thomas J. Haley, Saturnism,
Pediatric and Adult Lead Poisoning, in CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY, Mar. 1971, at 11 (stat-
ing that lead exposure and resulting "[s]aturnism or planetism with all its deleterious
effects on the human body was well known to the Greeks and Romans"); F.D. Tim-
mins, The Danger of Lead in Paints, ANNALS OF OCCUPATIONAL HYGIENE, Apr. 15,
1972, at 117 (discussing British lead paint regulations dating back to 1927).
234 See supra text accompanying note 207.
235 Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1244. The court's disinclination to view the plaintiffs'
requests favorably may have been encouraged by plaintiff's having requested costs
for "transportation expenses, attendance at public meetings, and the loss of beneficial
use of gardens and property, and participation in citizens associations and groups
formed to aid an investigation in cleanups efforts," id., in addition to medical costs.
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requests were less comprehensive than the medical treatment requested
by plaintiffs in Daigle and are arguably in line with CERCLA's general
purpose of effecting a thorough and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste
sites.
In fact, medical monitoring and surveillance information of the type
requested in Ambrogi could be used as an indicator of the success or
failure of a cleanup. For example, data as to the continuing health effects
of lead levels in the soil and water around the homes of the Ambrogi
plaintiffs would be invaluable information in determining the complete-
ness of the cleanup.
However, the burden remains on plaintiffs to frame their pleadings
narrowly so as to make courts understand that they are seeking cleanup
expenses and not personal damages or reimbursement for past or future
economic loss. The Ambrogi plaintiffs probably would have done better
by linking their request for "health effect" studies to CERCLA's statu-
tory purpose to promote cleanup of the environment and the health of
the people who occupy it. The problem for the environmental justice
reformer is that there are no clearly distinct terms to indicate when a
party seeks monitoring and not treatment. Terms such as "health effects"
and "assessment" studies are too ambiguous to clarify the differences
between the meanings of the terms.
The advocate therefore must be conscious of the need to educate
courts-in pleadings and at oral arguments-as to the differences
between each of the following activities: monitoring, diagnosis, and treat-
ment. The advocate should formulate a long-term strategy aiming to seek
recovery for medical treatment costs through tort or other causes of
action only after sufficient CERCLA medical monitoring data has been
collected to provide information about negative health effects before,
during, and after a CERCLA cleanup. In addition, plaintiffs should spec-
ify exactly what studies they have conducted, and plan to conduct,
together with an estimate of costs and other details. 36
It is crucial to draft pleadings carefully so as to respect the courts' wari-
ness about awarding response costs that might be characterized as efforts
to recover for personal damages or economic loss. Such pleadings should
See id. at 1250 (stating that "organizational costs" such as transportation and attend-
ance at public meetings are not covered by the statute). The expansiveness of the
plaintiffs' claims may have made the court especially reluctant to grant any of them,
for fear of broadening potential avenues for recovery under CERCLA. The lesson
for the environmental justice advocate may be, regrettably, that claims for relief
sought under CERCLA cost recovery actions should be reduced to the absolute mini-
mum if they are to succeed.
236 In deciding what studies to conduct and how to conduct them, plaintiffs may
avail themselves of existing models. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; supra
text accompanying notes 46-47.
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address the question posed by Chief Judge Conaboy, the trial judge in
Ambrogi, who felt
compelled to respond to one basic and very practical question that
has remained unanswered throughout our analysis. That is, if the
cost for air, soil, and water testing and monitoring can be recovered
under CERCLA, why is the cost for assessing the human condition,
through medical screening and other biological testing, not covered
under this statute.23 7
His answer was two-fold. First, like the Coburn court, he looked to the
creation of the ATSDR under SARA as the sole remedial provision for
medical monitoring.23 8 Second, he argued that "the traditional remedies
of state tort actions are available to an aggrieved individual.,
23 9
Both of these responses miss the point. As one commentator has elo-
quently argued, the ATSDR was neither intended to serve nor has it been
used to conduct the sort of medical monitoring appropriate as evidence of
contamination at an individual CERCLA site; the ATSDR is not an
exclusive remedy under CERCLA for the assessment of possible damage
to health.24° As even the Daigle court recognized, "the liability and fund-
237 Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1249.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 1249-50.
240 Tanenbaum, supra note 38, at 945-46 (explaining the role and enforcement of
the ATSDR); see also Blumenberg, supra note 58, at 677 (recognizing that the
ATSDR does not provide compensation for toxic exposure victims' medical monitor-
ing); Environmental Research Foundation, Congress Creates A Monster: The ATSDR
(pt. 1 of What Has Gone Wrong?), RACHEL'S HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, July 1,
1992, at 1 (detailing agency mismanagement, limited resources, and lack of focus);
Health Risk Assessments at Waste Sites Assailed Superfund Studies Not Useful, GAO
Says, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 4, 1991, at A2 (describing how the ATSDR "was so rushed
that for 165 Superfund sites it simply found documents already prepared for other
reasons and called them health assessments"); cf Brennan, supra note 20, at 50 n.175
(citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 961 (1991), in which an ATSDR study and ATSDR documents served a
significant role in the Third Circuit's decision to overturn the lower court's decision to
grant defendant's summary judgment motion). The ATSDR "has established Com-
munity Assistance Panels (CAPs) to provide a means of exchanging information with
communities during public health assessments." Chase, supra note 16, at 365. How-
ever, studies continue to validate Tanenbaum's observations of the ATSDR's limita-
tions due to its narrow mandate and sparse resources. See, e.g., ATSDR Finds
Higher-Than-Average Disease Rates Among People Exposed to TCE in Drinking
Water, [Current Developments] 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 465,465-66 (July 16, 1993) (dis-
cussing a long-term study of 5000 subjects who had been exposed to TCE in which
results were compared to the general population and segregated by age and sex, but
not by race).
Furthermore, the ATSDR is not funded at levels that will make a serious difference
for people affected by environmental injustice. Tanenbaum, supra note 38, at 946;
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ing for ATSDR costs are separate from response costs."' 241 Furthermore,
Chief Judge Conaboy's suggestion that plaintiffs use state tort claims is an
unacceptable solution because some states do not allow recovery of medi-
cal monitoring costs, or establish substantial barriers to such recovery,242
see, e.g., ATSDR Makes $750,000 Available in 1994 for Site-Specific Health Impact
Studies, [Current Developments] 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 638 (Aug. 13, 1993). This
amount will be divided into ten awards to be distributed among state, territorial, and
Indian public health agencies. Inasmuch as a single cleanup of an uncontrolled haz-
ardous waste site can exceed this amount by several hundred percent, it cannot be
said that the ATSDR constitutes a serious commitment to studying the public health
threat of individual toxics sites. Cf Keith Schneider, E.P.A. Superfund at 13: A White
Knight Tarnished, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at 7 (reporting that the average
Superfund cleanup now takes more than 10 years and costs on average more than $30
million).
241 Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1537 (10th Cir. 1992).
242 See, e.g., Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 38-39 (4th Cir. 1991)
(affirming the district court's ruling that "the common law of West Virginia and Vir-
ginia would not allow the plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional distress or the
costs of medical surveillance" and citing decisions from "[niumerous courts [that]
have held that exposure to hazardous substances does not constitute a physical
injury"). Congress was aware of the limitations of state tort causes of action when it
passed CERCLA. The 1980 CERCLA Senate Committee Report cited a Library of
Congress study concluding that victims of chemical disasters who resorted to state law
remedies found that
the legal mechanisms in the States studied [Alabama, California, Michigan, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, and Texas] are generally inadequate for redressing toxic sub-
stances-related harms, and traditional tort law presented substantial barriers to
recovery .... [Sleeking compensation for pollution-related injuries is usually
cumbersome, time-consuming and expensive. In the releases studied (some
involving many exposures), few cases were filed and final judgments were rarely
obtained .... [A]s a consequence of these difficulties, the compensation ulti-
mately provided to injured parties is generally inadequate.
S. REP. No. 848, supra note 49, at 13-14.
State tort laws indicate widely divergent state standards for medical monitoring
relief. For example, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Virginia, West Virginia, and even
New Jersey (which was once viewed as an especially progressive jurisdiction for medi-
cal monitoring awards) require proof of physical injury-a difficult standard to meet.
See Delaware: Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 1984)
(requiring direct contact with a toxic contaminant); Florida: Eagle-Picher Indus. v.
Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (intimating a requirement of physi-
cal injury and stressing the importance of finality to remove the burden from defend-
ants of protracted litigation and anticipating lawsuits); Illinois: Campbell v. A.C.
Equipment Serv. Corp., 610 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that a cause
of action to recover medical monitoring costs will be recognized if current physical
injury is present); Virginia and West Virginia: Ball v. Joy Mfg., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1371
(S.D. W. Va. 1990) (finding that both Virginia and West Virginia law preclude recov-
ery without evidence that "future [medical] expenses are reasonably certain to be
incurred as a result of an injury of the plaintiff that was proximately caused by the
defendant's actions"), aff'd, 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991); New Jersey: Theer v. Philip
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Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993) (stating that the "special compensatory dam-
age" remedy affirmed in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987),
"is not easily involved," and requires experience of "direct and hence discrete expo-
sure to a toxic substance").
Other states apply less stringent standards, typically requiring evidence of damag-
ing exposure if not actual injury. Nonetheless, the standards vary enormously as to
what plaintiffs must show. See Arizona: Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28,
33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that, in order to obtain medical monitoring costs,
the presence of injury is not required if the plaintiff has been seriously exposed to
asbestos and is at risk of disease); California: Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App.
4th 1651, 1657 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating that a toxic-tort plaintiff can obtain medical
monitoring costs by demonstrating a reasonable certainty of after-effects due to the
toxic substance exposure); Kentucky: Bocook v. Ashland Oil Co., 819 F. Supp. 530,
537 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (determining Kentucky's standard to require only proof of
some slight physical harm and concluding that monitoring is desirable because of the
benefits of early disease detection); Michigan: Meyerhoff v. Turner Constr. Co., 509
N.W.2d 847, 850 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that medical monitoring expenses are
compensable when the plaintiff has proven "that such surveillance to monitor the
effect of exposure to toxic substances ... is reasonable and necessary" and listing
among the factors to be considered in determining whether medical monitoring dam-
ages are reasonable and necessary: "[Tihe significance and extent of the exposure; the
toxicity of the substance; the seriousness of the diseases for which individuals are at
risk; the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in those exposed; and the
value of early diagnosis"); New York: Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d
130, 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that medical monitoring costs are available if
the plaintiff has an increased risk of contracting disease as a result of exposure); North
Carolina: Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969, at *51-52
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990) (holding that under North Carolina law, a state court would
decline to create such a tort and that, at a minimum, such an action could be main-
tained only if a plaintiff made "a prima facie case on medical causation"); Ohio: Ver-
bryke v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1162, 1167 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(recognizing that once exposure to asbestos is discovered, "it now becomes medically
prudent to monitor [plaintiff's] condition"); Pennsylvania: Merry v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 850 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that "in order to recover
medical surveillance costs, plaintiff must establish (1) exposure to hazardous sub-
stances; (2) potential for injury; and (3) the need for early detection and treatment");
Utah: Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993) (holding
that in order to obtain medical monitoring costs, a plaintiff must prove exposure to a
toxic substance caused by defendant's negligence and that the exposure significantly
increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff).
This is not to say that state environmental tort claims will always fail. See Brennan,
supra note 20, at 52-54 (discussing the information-creating aspects of state right-to-
know statutes); cf. Recent Developments, [1993 News & Analysis] 23 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,392, 10,392 (June 1993) (discussing Escamilla v. Asarco, Inc., No.
91 CV 5716 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 1993), settlement approved, Escamilla v. Asarco, Inc.,
No. 91 CV 5716 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 1993)):
A Colorado district court, in a class action suit about contamination to real prop-
erty, entered judgment against the defendant for $28,125,000 .... The court held
that although a proposed CERCLA settlement between the defendant and Colo-
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to say nothing of the considerable burdens such actions place on
plaintiffs.24
3. Cook v. Rockwell International Corp.
244
Of the cases cited in support of the Coburn analysis, Cook is of special
interest. Decided by the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado-a court within the Tenth Circuit, which would decide Daigle
only one year later-Cook staked out a moderate position with respect
to the recovery of CERCLA medical monitoring costs. Although Cook
is generally cited as one of the cases to support the Coburn position,245
when read carefully Cook takes a more considered view of the issue, one
from which environmental justice advocates can learn. In fact, the deci-
sion is rich with potential for the environmental justice cause.
In Cook, the plaintiffs-individuals and businesses who owned land
near the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant-sought medical monitor-
ing costs under CERCLA to study both the health and the environmental
effects of any releases from the plant.246 The district court held that some
medical monitoring costs were not recoverable under CERCLA.247
In part, Cook adopted the logic of Coburn, as expanded by Ambrogi.
The Cook court favorably noted Ambrogi's emphasis on the availability
of medical monitoring through both the ATSDR and state toxic tort
actions.248 The court distinguished between health and environmental
monitoring by granting the defendant's motion to dismiss "the portion of
plaintiffs' CERCLA claim that seeks to recover the costs of medical test-
ing to monitor the health effects of defendants' releases, 249 but denying
"defendants' motions concerning the portion of plaintiffs' CERCLA
claim that seeks to recover the costs of medical testing necessary to moni-
tor the environmental effects of defendants' releases., 250 The court
explained that "[i]f plaintiffs can show that medical testing is necessary to
monitor the environmental effects of a 'release' or 'threatened release,'
the costs of such medical testing plainly fall within the purview of section
9601(25). ''251
rado provides for remediation of the class members' property under the state
record of decision, the jury's verdict represents its conclusion, supported by the
evidence that the proposed CERCLA settlement is "woefully inadequate" to
compensate class members for defendant's negligence.
243 Blumenberg, supra note 58, at 667-75 (discussing the inadequacy of traditional
tort analysis when applied to toxic-tort actions).
244 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1991).
245 See, e.g., Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
246 Cook, 755 F. Supp. at 1471.
247 Id. at 1474.
248 Id. (citing Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1248-49).
249 Id.
250 Id. at 1472.
251 Id. at 1474 (emphasis added). Earlier in the decision, Judge Babcock stated
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As argued earlier, the distinction between health and environmental
effects is logically insupportable, given that health is directly related to
and affected by the environment of which it is a part.252 Nonetheless,
Cook provides a precedent from which the environmental justice advo-
cate can articulate and build a CERCLA medical monitoring claim seek-
ing response costs for continuing medical testing of the people who live
and work in a contaminated environment.25 If plaintiffs have limited
financial resources and must therefore request medical treatment, Cook
suggests that such requests should be clearly bifurcated from requests for
relief under section 107(a)(4)(B), and instead be sought under other
causes of action-at least until a favorable medical monitoring case law is
more fully developed. In this way, plaintiffs may recover for medical
monitoring costs as part of a strictly "environmental" assessment.
Admittedly, Cook is not entirely sympathetic to CERCLA medical
monitoring claims. However, even to the extent that the court disallowed
such claims, its decision further suggests that such CERCLA response
costs constitute an appropriate alternative for communities seeking to
learn the incidence of toxic contamination on them and the environment
in which they live. On the one hand, in dicta the court indirectly recog-
nized the difficulty of bringing state tort claims in such cases: "Although
Colorado has yet to do so, I conclude that the Colorado Supreme Court
that costs of recovery for post-judgment studies would not be allowed: "As plaintiffs
acknowledge, CERCLA allows recovery only of costs that have been incurred by a
plaintiff before judgment." Id. at 1473 (citing Williams v. Allied Automotive Autolite
Div., 704 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D. Ohio 1988). However, Judge Babcock failed to note
a crucial point in Williams, namely "that although liability for future costs can pres-
ently be determined and declaratory relief granted, the Court cannot award costs until
they are incurred." Williams v. Allied Automotive Autolite Div., 704 F. Supp. 782,
784-85 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (citing United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F.
Supp. 391, 407-08 (W.D. Mo. 1985), Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1430
(S.D. Ohio 1984), United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 852 (W.D. Mo. 1984), State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,
1316 (N.D. Ohio 1983)); see Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d
1380, 1387 n.ll (5th Cir. 1989); Bowen Eng'g v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F. Supp. 467, 476
(D.N.J. 1992); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (N.D. Ill.
1988). Thus, liability for future recovery costs-such as medical monitoring-can be
established, even though costs cannot be awarded until incurred.
252 See supra part V.A.
253 Tactically, the environmental justice advocate should recognize that courts tend
to view ambitious requests for compensation of medical monitoring with extreme sus-
picion. For example, in Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla.
1991), plaintiffs sought medical monitoring costs that included transportation, lodg-
ing, and meal costs associated with their attendance at conferences on chemical con-
tamination. Id. at 1469. The court rejected these expenses on the ground that they
did not further the purpose of cleaning up a hazardous waste site. Id. at 1470; see
supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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would probably recognize, in an appropriate case, a tort claim for medical
monitoring. 25 4 On the other hand, the court stated that "the allegation
of mere risk of exposure, and not exposure in fact, is inadequate. 255
Herein lies the Catch-22: "[M]ere risk" is not enough to bring a claim, but
the "mere risk" may not become "exposure in fact" for years to come. 256
As applied to CERCLA, this logic conflicts with the statute's purpose of
completely and thoroughly cleaning up contaminated waste sites. The
environmental justice advocate should emphasize that the people who
live and work near a site could provide invaluable evidence of the damag-
ing effects of contamination before, during, and after a cleanup. In addi-
tion, long-term medical monitoring of these populations will help assure
that the statute protects the public health, welfare, and the environment.
The Cook court concluded that the Colorado Supreme Court would
not
recognize as cognizable plaintiffs' claim for generalized scientific
studies.
A medical monitoring claim compensates a plaintiff for diagnostic
treatment, a tangible and quantifiable item of damage caused by a
defendant's tortious conduct. Such relief is akin to future medical
expenses. The claim does not compensate a plaintiff for testing
others to determine the odds that a particular person might contract
a disease.257
Thus, the court appears to state that testing is the first stage in diagnosis,
which is in turn the first stage in treatment. As this Article has stressed,
there is no statutory basis to support this "slippery slope" argument.
Although Cook's analysis is more favorable for advocates of CERCLA
medical monitoring claims than it is usually given credit for, it would be
mistaken to view the case as a wholesale endorsement of the position
outlined in this Article. For instance, in the above-quoted language,
Cook suggests that medical monitoring actions should be framed as indi-
vidual and not as group claims. However, the environmental justice
advocate will argue that it is not only conceivable but likely that if one
person who lives or works in a particular area shows signs of being
affected by contamination, others in the area will manifest comparable
symptoms. It is therefore reasonable for a court to permit community
plaintiffs as a group to advance medical monitoring claims if some of
them evidence exposure symptoms meriting evaluation. Yet the Cook
court did not explain why every member of the community must demon-
strate exposure-as opposed to the generalized class-in order to estab-
254 Cook, 755 F. Supp. at 1477 (emphasis added).
255 Id.
256 See Blumenberg, supra note 58, at 669 (discussing procedural obstacles that
may hinder recovery in toxic exposure cases).
257 Cook, 755 F. Supp. at 1478.
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lish a medical monitoring claim.25 The result is that poor people in poor
communities cannot pool their resources in support of a common need.
Nonetheless, a careful reading of Cook confirms that it is far less dis-
missive of possible CERCLA medical monitoring claims than other
courts-including the Daigle court-have claimed. As such, Cook acts
as a bridge to the cases that are generally held to endorse the proposition
that medical monitoring expenses are recoverable costs of response under
CERCLA.
D. The Error of Coburn and Its Progeny: Learning from Brewer v.
Ravan259
In uncritically following Coburn's logic, subsequent courts have con-
sistently narrowed CERCLA's scope by ignoring the statutory require-
ment that liable parties must take all steps necessary in a "removal"
action to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or
welfare, or to the environment. 260 The environmental justice advocate
therefore must simultaneously emphasize the overly narrow readings of
CERCLA's response cost provisions-and also, as with Daigle, misread-
ings of medical monitoring decisions-and remain focused on the short-
term goal of winning response costs for medical monitoring. The advo-
cate must educate courts that medical monitoring, taken alone, does not
transform CERCLA into a toxic tort recovery statute.
In addition to Cook, a good source from which to begin to draw such
lessons is the opinion of Chief Judge Wiseman in Brewer, a class action
filed by former employees of a capacitor manufacturing plant and their
families in Tennessee. 261 The plaintiffs alleged violations not only of
CERCLA, but also of three other major federal environmental laws.262
258 Cf Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988):
[In] mass tort accidents, the factual and legal issues of a defendant's liability do
not differ dramatically from one plaintiff to the next. No matter how individual-
ized the issue of damages may be, these issues may be reserved for individual
treatment with the question of liability tried as a class action. Consequently, the
mere fact that questions peculiar to each member of the class remain after the
common questions of the defendant's liability have been resolved does not dic-
tate the conclusion that a class action is impermissible.
259 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). The environmental justice advocate
should note that Chief Judge Wiseman is a federal district court judge within the
southeast United States, the geographic area that largely overlaps with EPA Region
IV, a region that has one of the highest concentrations of uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites in the nation. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at xiv, 19-20, tbl. B-
7 (listing the locations of the highest concentrations of hazardous waste sites along
with respective minority populations).
260 See supra part V.C.
261 Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1178.
262 Id. (alleging violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1988), the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), 33
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The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.263
The court denied the motion with respect to the claim for medical mon-
itoring costs, finding that treatment is a discrete activity, distinguishable
from medical testing or surveillance. 26 Brewer thus recognized that
medical treatment costs are not compensable as "necessary costs of
response., 265 However, the court also recognized that because "[p]ublic
health related medical tests and screening clearly are necessary to 'moni-
tor, assess, [or] evaluate a release,' [they] therefore constitute 'removal'
under [CERCLA] section 9601(23). "266 The court stated further that
"[t]o the extent that plaintiffs seek to recover the cost of medical testing
and screening conducted to assess the effect of the release or discharge on
the public health or to identify potential public health problems presented
by the release, however, they present a cognizable claim under section
9607(a)."267 By contrast, Coburn relied upon the assumption that at a
specific moment "cleanup" is underway and the threat of contamination
disappears, thereby removing dangers to the public health and welfare.268
Following Brewer, a properly constructed medical monitoring plan
would test people before, during, and after a CERCLA cleanup. Such a
plan would indeed monitor, assess, and evaluate in the preferred diction-
ary meanings of those words. Brewer thus supports the proposition that
human beings whose medical conditions are monitored, assessed, and
evaluated during and following a CERCLA cleanup can provide evidence
of the cleanup's success in eliminating the threat of hazardous wastes. 2 9
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1377 (1988), and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA), 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988)).
263 Id.
264 Id. at 1179.
265 Id. (noting that "CERCLA's legislative history clearly indicates that medical
expenses incurred in the treatment of personal injuries or disease caused by an unlaw-
ful release or discharge of hazardous substances are not recoverable under section
9607(a)" (citations omitted)).
266 Id. This statement is the one with which the Coburn court took exception,
explaining that "we find it difficult to understand how future medical testing and
monitoring of persons who were exposed to contaminated well water prior to the
remedial measures currently underway will do anything to 'monitor, assess, [or] evalu-
ate a release' of contamination from the site." Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 28 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1671 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
267 Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179 (second emphasis added).
268 Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1671.
269 Medical monitoring could reduce costs to industry in the long run by identify-
ing injuries that may not manifest themselves until years later. Thus, the earlier the
detection, the earlier and less-expensive the treatment and cure. Also, by paying for
medical monitoring costs in the present, possible defendants could avoid fraudulent
claims in the future by ensuring that exposure to hazardous substances are contained
or at least rendered negligible.
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It should be stressed that a successful CERCLA medical monitoring
claim must strive not only to satisfy the statute's general mandate to pro-
tect the public health or welfare, or the environment-it must also specif-
ically link cost recovery requests to particular, statutorily-mandated
activities. The environmental justice advocate should outline the sense in
which medical surveillance is necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate
the success and efficiency of a cleanup. This may mean devising a plan of
action that is backed up with scientific, medical, and engineering data. °
Unlike Coburn, by allowing plaintiffs to proceed past the motion to
dismiss, the decision in Brewer supports the notion that a court should
have the opportunity to hear adequate expert and other testimony con-
cerning the possible benefits of medical monitoring. During discovery,
plaintiffs thus could gather medical, engineering, and scientific evidence
as to the possible usefulness of medical surveillance in a thorough and
efficient cleanup plan.27' Precisely because "necessary costs of response"
is an ill-defined term in the statute, courts therefore should allow such
discovery to explore the possible advantages of medical monitoring.
CONCLUSION
The cases disallowing CERCLA medical monitoring and surveillance
expenses as necessary costs of response under section 107(a)(4)(B) pro-
mote an approach to federal environmental statutes that considers the
Despite this logic, courts often seem reluctant to award medical monitoring costs
for fear that to do so would lead to corporate economic devastation. See, e.g., Ball v.
Joy Mfg., 755 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (rejecting the plaintiffs' medical moni-
toring claim purely for economic reasons); supra note 242. Although the Ball court
found meritorious reasons for allowing individuals to recover the costs of medical
monitoring, it held that compensating the plaintiffs when they had suffered no
demonstrable injury could devastate the corporate defendant. Id. at 1372.
270 The potential costs of obtaining such data can seem daunting to grassroots
groups unaccustomed to dealing with-and requesting help from-professionals.
However, in my experience, medical professionals often are eager to help testify on
behalf of efforts that they see as promoting the larger goal of preventive health care.
The same is likely to hold true for scientists and engineers. Part of the task here is to
make information about potential resources available to communities. New York
City's plan to create neighborhood "environmental watchpersons" is one effort to fill
this gap. See GREENPOINT, supra note 103, at 14; Hernandez Interview, supra note
103.
271 Brewer recognized, by contrast, the fact that the motion to dismiss required a
more developed factual record: "Although... it is unclear whether the medical tests
and screening allegedly conducted by plaintiffs were public health related, at this
early stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot say that it appears beyond doubt that
plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their CERCLA claim." Brewer, 680
F. Supp. at 1179-80; cf. Hopkins v. Elano Corp., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1782 (S.D.
Ohio 1989) (finding that the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion was too early in
this context, and allowing that some costs might be compensable).
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environment in isolation from the society that inhabits it. 2 In this way,
the cases analytically separate environmental concerns from a larger
agenda for social reform. They promote a technical, scientific environ-
mental regime that relies upon an alienating array of statistics and regula-
tions criticized by Cole and others. As noted in Part II of this Article, the
burgeoning environmental justice movement already is deeply suspicious
of this regime. As a consequence, the courts that have disallowed CER-
CLA medical monitoring have given further justification to the suspicions
of those fighting for environmental justice, and have rendered one of our
principal federal environmental laws partly ineffective as a means to
address concerns of poisoned communities that bear the brunt of our
industrial pollution.
If it were not a cause for national disgrace, there would be a particular
irony in this. CERCLA was in large part a response to the health
problems suffered by residents of places like Love Canal, New York, who
lived on top of chemical contamination.273 Yet tragically, "[o]f the $4.2
billion spent annually in the United States, less than one percent has gone
to study health risks. 274 The CERCLA medical monitoring lawsuit can
help redirect the focus of the statute and allow it to accomplish its origi-
nal goals more effectively.
This Article ultimately is a plea for lawyers to serve a mediating func-
tion by using federal environmental laws, along with political empower-
ment, equal protection challenges, participation in the administrative and
rulemaking processes, and state law causes of action, as strategic tools to
oppose widespread instances of environmental injustice.
It is my further hope that this Article will prompt environmental law-
yers to explore the whole arsenal of federal environmental laws to the
advantage of beleaguered, poor communities, and particularly communi-
ties of color. For example, lawyers should rely not only upon CERCLA
medical monitoring lawsuits, but they also should educate their clients
and encourage them to press for more vigorous enforcement of criminal
sanctions, under CERCLA, RCRA, TSCA, and other statutes, against
corporate officers whose companies pollute. 5  Other options may
272 See supra part V.B.
273 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 848, supra note 49, at 8-10.
274 Environmental Research Foundation, National Academy Study Says Superfund
Dumps Cause Many Illnesses in Humans, RACHEL'S HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Feb.
5, 1992, at 1 (reprinting Anthony B. Miller, Assessing the Threat of Toxic Waste Sites).
275 For a summary of the most important of these sanctions, see R. Christopher
Locke, Environmental Crimes: The Absence of "Intent" and the Complexities of Com-
pliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311, 314-18 (1991). The environmental crimes sec-
tion of the U.S. Department of Justice has increasingly come under attack for being
too lenient in its prosecution of corporate offenders. See, e.g., Diana R. Gordon, Can
Reno Be the People's Lawyer?, 258 THE NATION 370, 371 (1994) (alleging that Attor-
ney General Janet Reno " 'doesn't have a clue' " about the failings of the U.S.
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include tactics such as opposing emissions trading credits under the
revised Clean Air Act.76 when they adversely and consistently affect the
poor and communities of color. In short, environmental lawyers should
recognize that they have a vital role to play in protecting the public health
and welfare, and the environment.
Department of Justice's environmental crimes unit (quoting an anonymous environ-
mental lawyer)); Environmental Crime Unit Probed, CH. TRIB., June 10, 1993, at 25.
276 Clean Air Act, § 173, 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing for
the granting of permits to new emissions sources so long as emissions are reduced in
other nearby locales).
